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ELEMENTS 



31 



OF 



LOGICK. 



BY JOHN ANDREWS, D. D. 

VICE-PROVOST OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA. 
THE SECOND EDITION' 

WITH CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS. 

Quicquid praecipies, esto brevis ; ut cito dicta 
Percipiant animi dociles, teneantqiie fideles. 
Omne supervacuum pleno de pectore manat. 




PHILADELPHIA: 

PRINTED FOR AND PUBLISHED BY B. B. HOPKINS AND CO. 
NO. 170, MARKET STREET. 

FRY AND KAMMERER, PRINTERS. 

isor. 



JCio\ 
M 



District of Pennsylvania, to wn : 

BE IT REMEMBERED, Tnat on the second 
Day of December in the thirty-second year of 
the Independence of the United States of Amer- 
ica, a. d. 1807, Benjamin B. Hopkins &. Co. of 
the said District, have deposited in this Office the title of a 
Book, the right whereof the)' claim as Proprietors, in the 
words following 1 , to wit : 

"Elements of Logic. By John Andrews, d. d. vice pro- 
44 vost of the university of Pennsylvania. The second edition, 
u with corrections and additions. 

" Quicquid praecipies, esto brevis; lit cito dicta 
u Percipiant animi dociles, teneantque fideles. 
" Omne supervacuum pleno de pectore manat." 
In conformity to the act of the Congress of the United 
States, intituled, " An act for the encouragement of learn- 
ing, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to 
the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times 
therein mentioned :" And also to the act, entitled, " An act 
supplementary to an act, entitled, c An act for the encourage- 
ment of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, 
and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies 
during the times therein mentioned,' and extending the 
benefits thereof to the arts of designing, engraving, and 
etching historical and other prints." 

D. CALDWELL, 
Clerk of the District of Pennsylvania 



PREFACE. 



Of the few treatises of Logick which 
the author of the following compilation 
has perused, Duncan's has always ap- 
peared to him to be the best. But this 
treatise, however excellent, is for the 
most part too diffusive, and in some 
places, perhaps, even too scientifick, for 
the use of young beginners ; at the same 
time that it omits a number of particu- 
lars, of which (as they are generally 
taught in the schools, and occasionally 
alluded to in conversation as well as 
books) a teacher would not wish his 



4 

pupils to be wholly ignorant. To obvi- 
ate these objections, and yet retain as 
much as possible the features of Dun- 
can, is the aim of the present compend; 
which was composed some years ago, 
and is now printed that the classes, for 
whose use it was intended, may no 
longer have the trouble of transcrib- 
ing it. 



ELEMENTS 



OF 



LOGICK. 



Logigk is that science which explains 
the operations of the human under- 
standing, in acquiring and communicat- 
ing knowledge. And as these have 
been usually stated to be four,— appre- 
hending, JUDGING, REASONING, and 

arranging our thoughts in a suita- 
ble manner; so Logick, which treats of 
these operations, is usually divided into 
four parts. 

A2 



PART I. 

Of Simple Apprehension. 

Simple apprehension being that ope- 
ration of the mind by which it is fur- 
nished with ideas, a treatise on it, is, in 
a great measure, a treatise on ideas, and 
on the procedure of the mind with re- 
spect to them: and it is also a treatise 
on words and definitions; because, with- 
out these, we should often be at a loss 
both in acquiring and communicating 
our ideas. The first part, therefore, of 
Logick, may be divided into two chap- 
ters: One treating of ideas; and the 
other, of terms and definitions, 



CHAPTER I. 

Of Simple Apprehension^ and the faculties 

by which it is exerted. Of ideas ^ or the 

first principles of knowledge.... *.0f the 
sources from which they are derived; and 
of the different sorts of them. 

Simple Apprehension is that ope- 
ration of the understanding by which it 
attends to, and notices, the several ob- 
jects that are presented to it. It is caL- 
led simple apprehension, because it is 
employed in the mere apprehending or 
noticing of things : without comparing 
them with each other, or assigning to 
them any attributes; which is the pro- 
vince of judgment. And by this opera- 
tion it is, that the mind, as we have al- 



8 

ready observed, is furnished with ideas : 
for without previously attending to, and 
noticing, the objects that are presented 
to it, it is impossible that the mind should 
ever have any ideas of them ; or, in 
other words, be able to represent to it- 
self the appearances which they ex- 
hibit. 

In performing this operation, two fa- 
culties are made use of, which are quite 
distinct from each other; sensation, 
and consciousness. If the object oc- 
curring be an external thing, the mind 
perceives it, and its qualities, by means 
of the senses ; and the power of doing 
this is called the faculty of sensa- 
tion: if it be an internal thing, that is, 
if it be any operation or emotion of the 
mind, the mind attends to and notices it, 



9 
without making use, so far as we know, 
of any bodily organ ; and it is this power, 
which we call the faculty .of con- 
sciousness. 

The term idea is derived from the 
Greek word eJJW, I see ; and by ideas are 
meant, the views which the mind takes 
of things, when they are no longer pre- 
sent. In the language of the schools, 
ideas are the types or resemblances of 
things; and things themselves are the 
archetypes, or originals of which the 
resemblances are made. When an ex- 
ternal object is present, and attended to 
by my mind, I am said to perceive it; 
and when my mind is engaged in any 
operation, or agitated by any passion or 
emotion, I am said to be conscious of 
that operation, or of that passion or 



10 

emotion : but when the external object 
is no longer present, so as to affect the 
organs of sense, or when the operation 
which had engaged my mind has ceased 
to engage it, or the passion or emotion, 
by which I was agitated, now agitates 
me no more, I am capable of thinking 
of the object which I before perceived, 
or of the operation or emotion of which 
I was conscious, and of representing to 
myself the appearances which they re- 
spectively exhibited ; and when I do so, 
I am said to have ideas of them. 

It has been stated, that all external 
things and their qualities are noticed by 
means of the senses; and internal things, 
that is, the operations and emotions of 
the mind, by consciousness : now all 
the objects of which we have any know- 



II 

ledge, are either external things and 
their qualities, or the operations and 
emotions of the mind: and, consequent- 
ly, all our ideas, how numerous soever 
they may be, are derived from these 
two sources. 

As ideas are the first elements of all 
our knowledge; so sensation and con- 
sciousness are the first of our intellec- 
tual faculties which are exerted by us. 
And as we can have no ideas of the ope- 
rations of our own minds until these ope- 
rations are exerted; and as they cannot 
be exerted, before the mind is furnished 
with ideas of external things about which 
to employ them ; the ideas which give 
the first employment to our faculties, are 
evidently the ideas of external things, 
communicated by the senses : whence it 



12 
is plain, that all our knowledge must 
begin in sensation ; and that the opera- 
tion of this faculty is prior even to that 
of consciousness. 

Ideas are either simple or complex. 
A simple idea is an idea of a simple ob- 
ject ; that is, of an object without parts : 
or it may be defined, an idea which can- 
not be resolved into two or more ideas. 
A complex idea is an idea of a complex 
object ; that is, of an object that consists 
of parts: or, it is an idea, that may be 
resolved into two or more ideas. 

To the former of these classes belong 
all our ideas of qualities, and of the 
operations and emotions of our own 
minds. The qualities of external things 
are called sensible qualities; and 
may be reduced to five general heads. 



lb 

according to the several senses which 
are affected by them. Light and colours 
are perceived by the eye ; sounds, by the 
ear ; tastes, by the tongue ; smells, by 
the nose ; and heat and cold, roughness 
and smoothness, hardness and softness, 
&c., by the touch. Extension, figure, 
rest, and motion, we perceive by two 
senses ; seeing, and feeling. To which 
may be added, that our ideas of pleasure 
and pain, of power, existence, unity, 
and succession, are conveyed into our 
understandings both by sensation and 
consciousness ; that is, both by the ac- 
tion of objects around us, and the con- 
sciousness of what we feel within. 
Other qualities are intellectual, 

MORAL, &C. 

To this general view of our simple 
B 



14 

ideas may be subjoined the two follow- 
ing observations. Thtjirst is, that sim- 
ple ideas can only be conveyed into the 
mind by the proper channels and ave- 
nues provided by nature ; insomuch that 
if we are destitute of any of those inlets, 
all the ideas, thence arising, are abso- 
lutely lost to us ; nor can we, by any 
quickness of understanding, find a re- 
medy for this want. A man born blind 
is incapable of ideas of light and co- 
lours; as one, who is born deaf, can 
form no conception of sounds. And 
hence it appears, that these our simple 
ideas are just such as nature furnishes 
them* and have no dependence on our 
will: we can neither destroy them when 
in the understanding; nor fashion or 
invent any new one, not taken in by 



15 
the ordinary means of apprehension. 
So that the utmost bounds of human 
knowledge cannot exceed the limits of 
our simple ideas and their various com- 
binations- The second is, that though 
the mind, in multiplying its conceptions, 
can avail itself of no other materials than 
those which are furnished by sensation 
and consciousness; yet, as it has a 
power of combining these materials in 
a great variety of ways, it finds itself in 
possession of an inexhaustible treasure 
of ideas, sufficient to employ it to the 
full extent of its powers. 
Complex ideas are of two sorts: those 

WHICH ARE CONVEYED INTO THE MIND 
BY THINGS REALLY EXISTING IN NA- 
TURE; and those which are the 

WORKMANSHIP OF THE MIND ITSELF* 



16 

Things really existing in nature are 
all comprised under the general name of 
substances; which are either material 
or immaterial. And the usual definition 
of a substance is, that it is a thing which 
subsists of itself, without dependence 
upon any created being, and is the sub- 
ject of modes/* The idea, for example, 
of a material substance includes in it the 
idea of a thing subsisting of itself; and 
the ideas of its qualities, by which only, 
as we find by experience, it is made 
known to us : the idea of an immaterial 
substance, in like manner, includes the 
idea of a thing subsisting of itself; and 
the ideas of its operations, by which 
only, as we also find by experience, it is 
made known to us. And hence it ap- 
pears that it is not without reason, that 

• That is, of qualities or attributes 



17 
all our ideas of substances are consi- 
dered as complex ideas. 

Modes are divided into essential 
and accidental. An essential mode 
is that which cannot be separated from 
its subject, without destroying the na- 
ture of the subject: an accidental mode 
is that which may be separated from its 
svibject, and the nature of its subject re- 
main the same as it was before. Round- 
ness, for example, is an essential mode 
of a ball; because a thing cannot be a 
ball without being round: but any par- 
ticular colour is an accidental mode of a 
ball; because if a ball, which is now 
blue, were to be painted white, it would 
still be a ball as much as ever. 

Essential modes are divided into pri- 
mary and secondary. A primary es- 

B2 



18 
sential mode is that which is derived 
from no other mode, and constitutes a 
thing what it is. A secondary essential 
mode is that, which, although insepa- 
rable from its subject, is derived from 
some other mode. Thus roundness is a 
primary essential mode of a ball ; be- 
cause we do not conceive of it as deriv- 
ed from any ether quality of a ball: but 
volubility, or aptness to roll, is a secon- 
dary essential mode of a ball; because 
it arises from another quality of it, that 
is, its roundness. The primary essential 
mode has been called differentia, or 
the difference; the secondary essential 
mode, proprium, or a property; and the 
accidental mode, accidens. 

Complex ideas, which are the work- 
manship of the mind, are divided into 



19 

COMPOUND, UNIVERSAL, GENERAL, OY 

ABSTRACT, and RELATIVE. 

Compound ideas are those, which the 
mind forms by putting two or more 
ideas together. These combinations are 
sometimes made by adding the same* idea 
to itself; thus, by adding the idea of 
unity to itself repeatedly, and retaining 
the several amounts in our minds, we 
come by all the different combinations of 
numbers: in the same way are formed 
the different ideas of yards, perches, fur- 
longs, miles, leagues, &c. ; also those of 
weeks, months, years, he. But, more 
frequently, our compound ideas are 
formed by combining ideas of a different 
kind together. The composer of mu- 
sick, for example, forms the idea of a 
tune which he is composing, and the 



20 
mechanick> the idea of a machine which 
he is projecting, — by bringing together, 
in the former case, a number of notes — 
and, in the latter, of parts, — that are 
different from each other. 

An abstract, universal, or, as it is 
more commonly called, a general idea, 
is an idea that will apply to several in- 
dividuals, or to several classes of indi- 
viduals. If it apply to individuals only, 
the class, which corresponds to it, and 
comprehends individuals, is termed a 
species; if to several classes of indivi- 
duals, the class which corresponds to it, 
and comprehends these several classes 
of individuals, is termed a genus. The 
formation of these ideas depends on a 
power which the mind possesses of re- 
moving, from its idea of any object, 



21 

what is peculiar to that object; from its 
idea of an individual, whatever is pecu- 
liar to that individual ; and from its idea 
of a "species, whatever is peculiar to that 
species: a power, which, by the writers 
on the human mind, is called the fa- 
culty of abstraction. And hence it 
appears, that it is not without reason, 
that our general ideas are ranked among 
those which are the workmanship of the 
mind, and have nothing in nature to 
which they correspond. 

But that this may be better under- 
stood, it will be worth while to take a 
more distinct view of the process of the 
understanding in the formation of these 
ideas. All the things in nature are in- 
dividual things: that is, every thing is 
itself, and one; and not another, and 



22 

more than one. But when we come to 
take a view of the several individuals, 
and observe that a number of them re- 
semble each other in one or more par- 
ticulars of importance, selecting the par- 
ticulars in which they agree, and remov- 
ing all those in which they disagree, we 
frame to ourselves a general idea appli- 
cable to several individuals ; that is, to 
a particular species. Thus certain ani- 
mals being found to resemble each other 
in having an erect form, and in being 
endowed with the faculties of reason 
and speech, we take these important 
particulars which are common to them 
all, and excluding what is peculiar to 
each, we form a general idea, to which 
we give the name of man; and this 
name belongs equally to every indivi- 



23 
dual who is possessed of the form and 
faculties above mentioned. This is the 
first step or gradation in the forming of 
abstract ideas, when the mind confines 

itself to the consideration of individuals, 
and frames an idea that comprehends 
such only under it. 

Again: having ranged things into 
species, according to the resemblance 
found among them, we begin to com- 
pare the several species with each other ; 
and often observe, in these also, a re- 
semblance, in one or more particulars 
of importance. Upon this, throwing out 
all the particulars in which they disa- 
gree, and retaining those only, in which 
there is a resemblance, we frame a still 
more general idea, comprehending un- 
der it several species. Thus, a sparrow, 



24 

a hawk, an eagle, &x. are distinct spe- 
cies of birds : they nevertheless resem- 
ble each other in being covered with 
feathers, and provided with wings which 
bear them through the air : out of these 
particulars we form a new idea, and 
appropriating to it the name bird, mark 
by that word a higher class, which 
comprehends in it all the former. This 
higher class, which extends to several 
species of things, is called a genus ; and 
is the second step which the mind takes 
in the formation of its general ideas. 

But, in rising from particulars to ge- 
nerals, the mind does not confine itself 
to one or two gradations. For when we 
have reduced things into species, and 
these again into genera, these genera 
are often found to resemble each other 



25 
in some particulars, which being com- 
bined together into one idea includes a 
new and more comprehensive class of 
things. Thus bird is a genus, compre- 
hending the several species of sparrow, 
hawk, eagle, he. : fish is a genus, includ- 
ing the several species of living crea- 
tures which inhabit the waters, as dol- 
phins, sturgeons, &c. : beast or quadru- 
ped, and insect, are also genera, which 
extend to many species : yet all these 
different genera have this in common, 
that they are provided with organical 
bodies fitted for the purposes of life 
and spontaneous motion. An idea, 
therefore, made up of these particulars 
only, will comprehend all the genera 
above mentioned ; and the word, animal, 
by which it is expressed, denotes a 



26 
higher genus, including the several 
creatures endued with life, sense, and 
spontaneous motion. 

Further : all things, animate and in- 
animate, resemble each other in this re- 
spect, that they are created; whence 
we refer them to a genus still higher, 
which may be called creature : a name, 
which belongs equally to every genus 
and species of created things, and to 
each individual thing that is created. 

And further still: all things, what- 
ever, exist, or are ; and in this respect are 
said to resemble each other; in which 
view we refer them to a genus still 
higher, called Being, which is the high- 
est possible genus. 

In a series of genera, rising in this 
manner one above another, each succes- 



27 

sive genus is called, in the schools, a 

GENUS GENERALIUS, Or HIGHER GENUS; 

and the genus by which each series is 
terminated, they distinguish by the 
name of genus generalissimum. In 
like manner, the several genera, compre- 
hended under a higher genus, are, in 
respect to it, considered as species; and 
as these have also species under them, 
the inferior divisions are, for the sake 
of distinction, termed species speciali- 
ores, or lower species. And the low- 
est subdivisions of all, comprehending 
only individuals, (which, as has been 
already mentioned, constitute the pro- 
per species) are, in respect to the series, 
denominated the species specialissi- 
mje. All that lie between these and the 
highest distribution of things, or genus 



28 
generalissimum, are the intermediate 
genera and species ; which are termed 
successively genus generalius, or spe- 
cies specialior, according as we consider 
them in the ascending, or descending, 
scries of our ideas ; or, to speak in the 
language of logicians, according to their 
ascent, or descent, in the linea predica- 
ment all. 

And here we may take occasion to 
mention merely, that, by the ancient 
writers of logick, a genus generalissi- 
mum, with all its divisions and subdivi- 
sions, was termed a category, or pre- 
dicament. And as Aristotle fancied, 
that all things in nature might be redu- 
ced to ten general heads, or classes, 
namely, substance, quantity, quality, rela- 
tion, action, passion, place, time, situation, 



29 
and doathing; these have been called 

THE TEN CATEGORIES. 

It is of more importance to remark, 
that, though many of our general ideas 
are evidently combinations of different 
simple ideas, and in that view of them 
are included in the class of compound 
ideas, we are carefully to distinguish 
between an idea as it is compound, and 
as it is general or universal. 

An idea is termed compound, with 
respect to the several ideas which are 
combined in it; general or universal, 
with respect to the individuals, species, 
or genera, to which it extends. Thus 
the idea of a bird, considered as a com- 
pound idea, includes life, sense, sponta- 
neous motion, a covering of wings, fea- 
thers, he. : but, as a general idea, it de- 

C2 



30 
notes the several species of the feathered 
creation, the hawk, the eagle, the lark, 
&c. ; to all which it extends with equal 
propriety. In the former case, the seve- 
ral parts of the compound idea are cal- 
led its comprehension; in the latter, the 
genera, the species, and the individuals, 
to which the universal idea may be ap- 
plied, are called its extension. 

The third and last division, of those 
complex ideas which are the workman- 
ship of the mind, consists of our relative 
ideas. A relative idea, is an idea which 
arises from the comparing of things, one 
with another, and observing their corre- 
spondencies. For the mind is not limited 
to the consideration of objects, as they 
are in themselves merely; but can ex- 
amine them as connected with other 



31 
things brought into view at the same 
time. And when it does so, and thence 
acquires new ideas, the ideas thus ac- 
quired are called relative ideas; and 
make, as is supposed, the largest class 
of our ideas. For every single object 
will admit of almost innumerable com- 
parisons with others, and, in this way, 
may become a very plentiful source of 
ideas to the understanding. Thus, if 
we compare one thing with another in 
respect to bulk, we get the idea of great- 
er and less, or of equality: if, in respect 
of time, of older and younger: and so of 
other relations, which we can pursue at 
pleasure, and almost without end. 

So much, with respect to ideas ; which 
are the subject of the first chapter. We 
have stated, that all our simple ideas are 



32 

conveyed into the understanding either 
by sensation or consciousness ; and are 
the materials out of which all others are 
formed: that the mind, though it has 
no power over these, either to fashion 
or to destroy them, can yet combine 
them in an infinite number of ways ; and 
that from their various combinations re- 
sult all our complex ideas : that these 
complex ideas are of two principal 
kinds ; first, such as are derived from 
without, and represent those combina- 
tions of simple ideas that have a real 
existence in nature, — of which sort are 
all our ideas of substances ; secondly, 
such as are formed by the mind itself, 
arbitrarily uniting and putting together 
its ideas: and that, as these last make 
by far the largest class, and comprehend 



33 

all those ideas which may be properly 
termed our own, as being the workman- 
ship of the understanding ; so they fall 
very naturally under three distinct heads. 
For either the mind combines several 
simple ideas together in order to form 
them into one complex idea, in which 
the number and quality of the ideas 
united are principally considered; in 
which way we become possessed of all 
our compound ideas: or it fixes upon 
any one of its ideas, whether it be a sim- 
ple or compound idea, or an idea of a 
substance, and leaving out the circum- 
stances of time, place, real existence, 
and whatever renders it particular, con- 
siders what it has in common with others, 
and of that makes an idea which will 
apply to all of a kind ; whence our ab- 



34 
stract or universal ideas are derived: or, 
lastly, it compares things one with an- 
other, examines their mutual connec- 
tions, and thereby furnishes itself with 
a new set of ideas, known by the name 
of relative ideas ; which, as has been al- 
ready remarked, make by no means the 
the least important class of our ideas. 



35 



CHAPTER II. 

Of Terms and Definitions. 

Having seen, in the preceding chap- 
ter, how our ideas are acquired; let us 
now proceed to examine how they are 
communicated. Ideas themselves are 
not visible, nor can they be perceived by 
any outward sense. But God, designing 
us for society, and to have fellowship 
with those of our kind, has provided us 
with organs fitted to frame articulate 
sounds, and given us also a capacity of 
using those sounds, or terms, as signs of 
ideas. Hence our ideas, which other- 
wise must have been locked up, as it 



36 

were, in our own breasts, are brought 
•forth and made to appear. For, any 
number of men having agreed to make 
use of the same sounds as signs of the 
same ideas, it is evident, that the repe- 
tition of these sounds must excite the 
same ideas in them all. When, for 
instance, any train of ideas takes posses- 
sion of my mind, if the terms, or sounds, 
by which I am wont to express them, 
have been annexed, by those with whom 
I converse, to the very same set of 
ideas, nothing is more evident, than that 
by repeating those terms, according to 
the tenour of my ideas, I shall raise in 
their minds the same train that has 
taken possession of my own. Hence, by 
barely attending to what passes within 
themselves, they will also become ac- 



37 

quainted with the ideas in my under- 
standing, and have them in a manner 
exposed to their view. 

So that we here clearly perceive how 
a man may communicate his sentiments 
to another; provided the language, in 
which he converses, be copious enough 
to contain words appropriated to all his 
ideas; and provided the person, to whom 
he speaks, is possessed of the same 
ideas which he expresses, and has been 
accustomed to connect them with the 
same terms. 

But as this is not always the case, 
and as we may often have occasion to 
communicate to others a new idea, that 
is, an idea that has never yet entered 
their minds, and which consequently 

D 



38 

they cannot as yet have connected with 
any term; it may be asked, by what 
means it is possible that the communi- 
cation of such an idea should be ef- 
fected. 

This appears to be a difficulty; and, 
to solve it, it will be necessary to ob- 
serve, first, that no word can be to any 
man the sign of an idea, till that idea 
comes to have a real existence in his 
mind. For words being only so far in- 
telligible, as they denote known ideas; 
where they have none such to answer 
to them, there they are plainly sounds 
without signification, and of course con- 
vey no information. But no sooner are 
the ideas, to which they belong, pro- 
duced in the understanding, than, find- 
ing it easy to connect them with the 



39 
established words, we can join in any 
agreement of this kind made by others, 
and enjoy the benefit of their discove- 
ries. The first thing, therefore, to be 
considered, is, how these ideas may be 
conveyed into the mind, that, they be- 
ing there, we may learn to connect them 
with the appropriated sounds, and so 
become capable of understanding others 
when they make use of these sounds 
in laying open and communicating their 
thoughts. Now to comprehend dis- 
tinctly how this may be done, it will be 
necessary to call to mind the before 
mentioned divisions of our ideas into 
simple and complex. And first, as to 
our simple ideas, it has been already 
observed, that they can find no admis- 
sion into the mind, but by the original 



40 
fountains of knowledge ; sensation, and 
consciousness. If therefore any of these 
have as yet no being in the understand- 
ing, it will be impossible by words to 
excite them there. A man, who had 
never felt the impression of heat, could 
not be brought to comprehend that sen- 
sation, by any thing which we could say 
to explain it. If we would produce the 
idea in him, it must be by applying 
the proper object to his senses, and 
bringing him within the influence of a 
hot body. When this is done, and ex- 
perience has taught him the sensation, 
to which men have annexed the name, 
hecit^ this term may then become to him 
the sign of that idea; and he is thence- 
forth capable of understanding the 
meaning of the term; which, before, all 



41 
the words in the world would not have 
been sufficient to convey into his mind. 
The case is the same with respect to 
light and colours : a man born blind, and 
by this misfortune destitute of the only 
conveyance for the ideas of these ob- 
jects, can never be brought to under- 
stand the terms by which they are ex- 
pressed. The reason is plain: they 
stand for ideas which have no existence 
in his mind ; and as the organ, appropri- 
ated to their reception, is wanting, all 
other contrivances are vain, nor can 
these ideas, by any force of description, 
be excited in him. But, with our com- 
plex ideas, it is quite otherwise. For 
these being no other than certain com- 
binations of simple ideas put together 
in various forms ; if the simple ideas, 

D2 



42 

out of which the complex ideas are 
made, have already got admission into 
the understanding, and the terms serv- 
ing to express them be known, it will 
be easy, by enumerating the several 
ideas included in the combination, and 
marking the order and manner in which 
they are united, to raise any complex 
idea in the mind. Thus the idea an- 
swering to the term, rainbow, may be 
readily excited in the imagination of an- 
other, who has never seen the appear- 
ance itself, by describing the figure, 
size, position, and order of colours; if 
we suppose these several simple ideas, 
with their names, sufficiently known to 
him. 

The answer, then, to the question 
proposed above, is now sufficiently ob- 



43 
vious. If the new idea, which we wish 
to communicate to others, be a simple 
idea, there is no other w r ay than to re- 
fer them to those objects in nature 
whence the idea is to be obtained: but, 
if it be a complex idea, its meaning may 
be explained by enumerating the ideas 
included in it ; that is, by defining it. 

And here we see the nature and use of 
definitions. They are used to unfold 
a complex idea ; and two things are re- 
quired in them: first, that all the simple 
ideas, out of which the complex one is 
formed, be distinctly enumerated; and, 
secondly, that the order and manner of 
combining them be clearly explained. 
Where a definition has these requisites, 
nothing is wanting to its perfection; be- 
cause every one, who reads it, and un- 



44 
derstands the terms, seeing at once what 
ideas he is to join together, and also in 
what manner, can, at pleasure, form, in 
his own mind, the complex idea answer- 
ing to the term defined. 

But this rule, though it extends to all 
possible cases, and is indeed that alone 
to which we can have recourse where 
any doubt or difficulty arises, it is not, 
however, necessary, or even expedient, 
to practise in every particular instance. 
Many of our ideas are extremely com- 
plex ; and, of course, to enumerate all 
the simple ideas, out of which they are 
formed, would be a very troublesome 
and tedious work. For which reason, 
logicians have established a certain com- 
pendious mode of defining; of which, 
it may not be amiss to give here a short 



45 

account. If the thing to be defined be 
a species, they give the nearest genus 
and the specifick difference; or, in 
other words, they refer it to its nearest 
genus, and then add those circumstances 
that make the species, which they are 
defining, to differ from every other 
species belonging to that genus. For, 
as the idea of a genus is formed by 
dropping what is peculiar to each of the 
several species referred to it, and re- 
taining those particulars which they 
all possess in common; so, on the other 
hand, by adding to the genus what is 
peculiar to any one of the species in- 
cluded in it, we form an adequate idea, 
and give a complete definition, of that 
species. In like manner, if the thing to 
be defined be an individual, the logical 



46 

definition will consist of the species 
and the numerical difference; or, in 
other words, of the species, and those 
particulars that distinguish the indivi- 
dual which we are defining, from every 
other individual belonging to that spe- 
cies. For, as the idea of a species is 
formed by dropping what is peculiar to 
the several individuals referred to it, 
and retaining those particulars only 
which they possess in common ; so, by 
adding to the species what is peculiar 
to any one of the individuals included 
in it, we form an adequate idea, and 
give a complete definition, of that indi- 
vidual. 

We shall conclude with observing, 
that definitions have been distinguished 



47 

into two kinds ; the definition of the 
name, and the definition of the 
thing. When the term to be defined, 
refers to the idea of the writer or speak- 
er, and the definition is designed to 
show what idea he connects with a cer- 
tain term, it is a definition of the name. 
And such definitions are said to be ar- 
bitrary; because, as words are not na- 
tural, but merely artificial, signs of 
ideas, every man is at liberty to annex 
to a term what idea he pleases. But 
where the reader, or hearer, is supposed 
to know that a certain term is connected 
with a particular idea, and where the 
design of the definition is to unfold that 
idea, that the nature of the thing of 
which it is the type or resemblance, 



48 

may be fully understood, it is a defini- 
tion of the thing. And such a defini- 
tion is not arbitrary: because the idea 
of any thing should be conformable to 
that thing ; and the definition, conforma- 
ble to the idea- 



49 



PART II. 

Of Judgment. 

All our knowledge may be reduced 
to two heads; our ideas of things, and 
the judgments which we form with re- 
spect to them. Of our ideas, and of 
terms and definitions by which they are 
communicated, we have already treat- 
ed. We come now to speak of our 
judgments; and of propositions, by 
which they are communicated. And 
here it will be proper to consider, first, 
the several grounds of human judg- 
ment; and, secondly, the different sorts 
of propositions. 



Q© 



CHAPTER L 

Of the grounds of human judgment; 
or y in other word$ y o/the differeni 

SORTS OF EVIDENCE. 

Judgment is that operation of the 
mind by which we compare two or more 
ideas together, with a view to determine 
whether they agree or disagree. But 
although, in every act of judgment, it is 
necessary to bring two or more ideas 
together, and place them, as it were, 
over against each other; yet, the mere 
comparing of two ideas together is not 
the evidence of their agreement or dis- 
agreement. What then, it may be ask- 
ed, is this evidence ? or rather, (as one 



51 

sort of truth is supported by one sort 
of evidence, and another by another), 
What are the different sorts of evi- 
dence ? 

To assist us in judging of this sub- 
ject, it will be necessary to observe, that 
all the objects of the human understand- 
ing are, either abstract notions of quantity 
and number, or things really existing. 
Of the relations of these abstract no- 
tions, all our knowledge is certain ; being 
founded on mathematical evidence. Of 
things really existing, we judge, either 
from our own experience, or from the 
experience of other men. Judging of 
real existence from our own experience, 
we attain either certainty or probability, 
Our knowledge of real things is certain, 
when supported by the evidence of ex* 



52 

ternal sense, consciousness, and memo- 
ry; and when from effects we infer 
causes. Our knowledge of real things 
is probable, when, from facts whereof 
we; have had experience, we infer facts 
of the same, or a similar, kind, not ex- 
perienced. Judging of real existence 
from the experience of other men, we 
have the evidence of their testimony. 
And thus it appears, that all sorts of 
evidence* productive of real knowledge, 
may be reduced to seven: 1. Mathemati- 
cal evidence. 2. The evidence of external 
sense. 3. The evidence of consciousness. 
4. The evidence of memory. 5. That 
evidence which we have, when from 
effects we infer causes. 6. The evidence 
oj testimony. 7. Probable evidence. 

Of MATHEMATICAL EVIDENCE there 



53 

are two sorts; intuitive, and demonstra- 
tive. Mathematical evidence is intuitive, 
when, from the very nature of the ideas 
compared, it appears, at first view, 
that they must necessarily agree or dis- 
agree. Mathematical demonstrative evi- 
dence is direct, or indirect. When a 
conclusion is inferred from principles 
which render it necessarily true, the 
demonstration is direct. When, by sup- 
posing a given proposition false, we 
are necessarily led into an absurdity, it 
is called indirect, apagogical, or ducens 
in absurdicm. Now that must be true, 
which we cannot, without absurdity, 
suppose to be false. And therefore both 
sorts of demonstration are equally good, 
because equally productive of absolute 
certainty. 

E2 



54 

All mathematical proof is founded 
upon axioms, or self-evident proposi- 
tions, the contraries of which are incon- 
ceivable. And this sort of proof seems 
to be peculiar to the sciences that treat 
of quantity and number; and therefore, 
in no other science is the mathematical 
method of proof to be expected. For, in 
the other sciences, in most of them at 
least, truth and its contrary are equally 
conceivable. That Julius Csesar died a 
natural death is as easy to be conceived, 
as that he was murdered in the senate- 
house. I feel a hard body, I do not feel 
a hard body, I see a white colour, I do 
not see a white colour, are all equally 
conceivable ; and yet may be either true 
or false according to circumstances. We 
may conceive that the sun, after setting 



55 

to-night, will never appear again, or that 
any particular man will never die : and 
vet we consider death as what must in- 
evitably happen to every man, and the 
rising of the sun to-morrow as -so certain, 
that no rational being can doubt of it. 
Though, therefore, the mathematical 
method of proof is to be found in the 
mathematical sciences only, yet satis- 
factory proof may be found in any 
other science: and is actually found, in 
every part of knowledge that deserves 
the name of science. 

The EVIDENCE OF EXTERNAL SENSE, 

no less than mathematical evidence, 
produces absolute certainty ; though in 
another way. Our perception of exter- 
nal things is attended with an irresistible 
belief, that they exist, and are what 



56 
they appear to be. When I see a man 
or a horse, I can no more doubt of his 
existence, than of my own ; and my own 
I believe with as full assurance as that 
two and two are four. The existence of 
body is a self-evident fact. It needs no 
proof; for to disbelieve or doubt of it, is 
impossible: and it admits of none ; be- 
cause we know of nothing more evident 
to prove it by. 

The EVIDENCE OF INTERNAL SENSE, 

or consciousness, does also produce 
absolute certainty. That we have within 
us a thinking and active principle, cal- 
led a soul or mind; which is the same 
thing to-day as it was yesterday; is 
conscious of its own thoughts; and ex- 
ercises a varietv of faculties different in 

it 

their objects and manner of operation; 



57 
are all of them suggestions of internal 
sense or consciousness, which we be- 
lieve because we feel them to be true ; 
and which if we were not to believe, 
would bring on us the charge of irra- 
tionality. 

The evidence of memory does also 
produce absolute certainty. A .child be- 
lieves, without any doubt, that, what he 
remembers distinctly to have seen or 
heard, he really did see or hear. And 
he believes this, not because he has been 
told that he may safely trust his memo- 
ry; but because the law of his nature 
determines him, of his own accord, to 
believe his memory as well as his sen- 
ses. Indeed if we were to distrust our 
memory, or treat it as a fallacious fa- 
culty, our senses would be of little 



58 
use to us, and we should be incapable 
both of knowledge and experience, and 
also of reasoning; for we cannot be 
satisfied with a proof, unless we re- 
member the steps of it, and believe 
that on that remembrance we may de- 
pend. Thoughts remembered may decay 
through length of time, and at last va- 
nish ; but, of an. event or object, that part 
which we distinctly remember, we be- 
lieve to have been real. We may for- 
get the whole subject of a book, and 
yet remember, and consequently be- 
lieve, that we read it. We may forget 
the proofs of a proposition, and yet re- 
member that it was formerly proved to 
our satisfaction, and acquiesce in it ac- 
cordingly. If in conceiving any event 
or object, we are uncertain whether we 



59 

remember or only imagine, belief is sus- 
pended and we remain in doubt; but no 
sooner are we conscious that we remem- 
ber, than belief instantly takes place ; 
and we say, I am certain it was so, for 
now I remember it distinctly. 

As tO THE EVIDENCE THAT WE HAVE 
WHEN FROM EFFECTS WE INFER CAUSES, 

we may observe, that the law of our 
nature determines us to believe, that 
whatever begins to exist, proceeds from 
some cause. If, on going home, I should 
find, on the'table, a book, which I never 
saw before, it would occur to me as ab- 
solutely certain, that some cause had 
brought and some person made it For 
if 1 were to be told, that nobody brought 
it, and that it never was made, I should, 
without hesitation, declare such a thing 



60 

to be not only absurd but impossible: 
and there is not one rational being who 
in this would refuse to concur with me. 
Even children think in this manner, and 
some are very inquisitive into the causes 
of things: a proof that it is not experi- 
ence merely which leads us to infer the 
cause from the effect. If the book, which 
I supposed myself to find, contained 
wise observations, and was well printed 
and bound, I must of necessity believe, 
that the author, printer, and binder, 
were possessed of wisdom and skill 
equal to the effect produced. — That 
being whom we believe to have pro- 
ceeded from no cause but the necessity 
of his own nature, and to be self-exist- 
ent, and on all other beings independent, 
we must also believe to have existed 



61 

from eternity, or, in other words, to have 
had no beginning. For if every thing 
that had a beginning, proceeded from 
some cause, that which proceeded from 
no cause, could have had no beginning. 
Probable evidence is of two sorts. 
One is, when, from facts whereof we 
have had experience, we infer facts of 
the same kind not experienced. It is na- 
tural for us to think, that the course of 
things whereof we have had experience^ 
and now have, wiii continue, unless we 
have positive reason to believe that it 
will be altered. This is the ground of 
many of those opinions which we ac- 
count quite ■ ertain. That to-morrow the 
sun will rise, and the sea ebb and flow ; 
that night will follow day, and spring 
succeed the winter; and that all men 



62 
will die; are opinions amounting to cer- 
tainty: and yet we cannot account for 
them otherwise than by saying, that such 
has been the course of nature hitherto, 
and we have no reason to believe that it 
will be altered. When judgments of this 
kind admit no doubt, as in the example 
given above, our conviction is called 
moral certainty. I am morally cer- 
tain, that the sun will rise to-morrow, 
and set to-day, and that all men will 
die, &c. The instances of past experi- 
ence, on which these judgments are 
founded, are innumerable ; and there is 
no mixture of contradictory instances 
which might lead us to expect a con- 
trary event. But if the experiences, on 
which we ground our opinions of this 
sort, are but few in number, or mixed 



63 

with contradictory experiences, in this 
case we do not consider the future 
event as morally certain; but only more 
or less probable according to the greater 
or less surplus of favourable instances. 
The other sort of probable evidence, 
which is termed analogical, is, when 
from facts whereof we have had experi- 
ence, we infer facts of a similar kind not 
experienced; or, in other words, when 
we expect similar events in similar cir- 
cumstances. For example, we think it 
probable that the planets are inhabited, 
they being in all respects so like our 
earth. The force of an argument from 
analogy is in proportion to the degree 
of likeness, that there is between the 
case from which we argue, and the 
case to which we argue. In the exam- 



64 
pie given, the case from which we 
argue, is the circumstance of this earth's 
being a planet, warmed and enlightened 
by the sun, and inhabited by many va- 
rieties of living creatures; and the case 
to which we argue, is that of the other 
planets, which being in all other re- 
spects so similar to our earth, we think 
it highly probable that they must re- 
semble it in thise, in being the habitation 
of percipient beings. A man who thinks, 
as Epicurus did, that they are no bigger 
than they appear to his eye, can have 
no notion of their being inhabited, be- 
cause to him they must appear in every 
respect so unlike our earth. And if we 
were to argue with him, in order to bring 
him over to our opinion, we should begin 
by explaining to him those particulars, 



65 
wherein the earth and the other planets 
resemble each other. As soon as he 
understands these particulars as well as 
we, he will, of his own accord, admit the 
probability of our opinion. 

Another and the last species of evi- 
dence, upon which we are to remark in 
this place, is testimony. It is natural 
for a man to speak as he thinks; and it 
is easy, like walking forward. One may 
walk backward, or sideways ; but it is 
uneasy, and a sort of force upon na- 
ture: and the same thing is true of 
speaking one thing and thinking another. 
It is also natural for us to believe what 
others seriously tell us. We trust the 
word of a man of whose veracity we 
have had experience ; but we also credit 
testimony previously to such experi- 

F2 



66 
ence; for children, who have the least 
experience, are the most credulous. It 
is from having had experience of the 
dishonesty of men, and of the motives 
that tempt them to it, that we come to 
disbelieve or to distrust what they say. 
In general, when we doubt a man's 
word, we have some reason for it. We 
think that what he says is incredible in 
itself; or, that there is some motive or 
temptation which inclines him in the 
present case to violate truth ; or, that he 
is not a competent judge of the matter 
in which he gives testimony ; or, lastly, 
we distrust him now, because we know 
him to have been a deceiver formerly. 
Faith in testimony often rises to ab- 
solute certainty. Of places and persons 
we never saw, and of which we know 



67 

nothing but from the testimony of others, 
we believe many things as firmly as we 
believe our own existence. This hap- 
pens, when the testimonies of men con- 
cerning such places and persons, are so 
many, and so consistent, that it seems 
impossible they should be fictitious. 
When a number of persons, not acting 
in concert, having no interest to dis- 
guise what is true, or to affirm what is 
false, and who are competent judges of 
what they testify, concur in making the 
same report, it would be accounted folly 
to disbelieve them, especially if what 
they testify be credible in itself. Even 
when three, or when two witnesses, se- 
parately examined, having had no op- 
portunity to concert a plan beforehand, 
concur in the same declaration, we be- 



68 

lieve them, though we have had no ex- 
perience of their veracity ; because we 
know, that in such a case their declara- 
tions would not be consistent, if they 
were not true. In regard to an impos- 
sible thing, we should not believe our 
own senses, nor consequently human 
testimony. Miraculous facts, however, 
are not to be ranked with impossibilities. 
To raise a dead man to life, to cure 
blindness with a touch, to remove lame- 
ness, or a disease, by speaking a word, 
are miracles: but to divine power as 
easy, as to give life to an embryo, make 
the eye an organ of sight, or cause ve- 
getation to revive in the spring. If it be 
asked, what evidence is sufficient to es- 
tablish the truth of miraculous events 
such as these, we answer, that every 



69 

event admits of a proof from human 
testimony, which it is possible for a 
sufficient number of competent witnes- 
ses to see and to hear. 



70 



CHAPTER II. 

Of Propositions and their various kinds. 

A proposition is a judgment of the 
mind expressed in words. Now as our 
judgments include at least two ideas, 
one of which is affirmed or denied of 
the other; so must a proposition have 
terms answering to these ideas. The 
idea, of which we affirm or deny, and of 
course the term expressing that idea, is 
called the subject of that proposition. 
The idea affirmed or denied, as also the 
term answering to it, is called the pre- 
dicate. Thus, in the proposition, God 
is omnipotent, — God is the subject, it 



71 

being of him that we affirm omnipo- 
tence; and omnipotent is the predicate, 
because we affirm the idea, expressed 
by that word, to belong to God. And 
that word, in a proposition, which con- 
nects the subject and predicate together, 
is called the copula; as in the above 
mentioned proposition, where is is the 
copula, and signifies the agreement of 
the ideas of God and omnipotence. But 
if we mean to separate two ideas, then, 
besides the copula we must also use 
some particle of negation to express 
this repugnance. Of this kind, the pro- 
position, man is not perfect, may serve 
as an example ; where the idea of per- 
fection being intended to be separated 
from the idea of man, the negative par- 
ticle not is inserted after the copula, 



72 

to signify the disagreement between the 
subject and the predicate. But although 
every proposition necessarily consists of 
these three parts, it is not alike neces- 
sary that they be all severally expres- 
sed in words ; because the copula is 
often included in the term of the predi- 
cate, as when we say he writes, which 
imports the same as he is writing. And, 
in the Latin language, a single word 
has often the force of a whole sentence ; 
where ambulat, for example, is the same 
as Me est ambulans; amo, as ego sum 
amans. 

Propositions are either affirmative 

Or NEGATIVE, UNIVERSAL Or PARTICU- 
LAR, ABSOLUTE Or CONDITIONAL, SIM- 
PLE Or COMPOUND, SELF-EVIDENT OV 



73 

DEMONSTRABLE, SPECULATIVE Or PRAC- 
TICAL. 

An affirmative proposition connects 
the predicate with the subject; as, A 
stone is heavy: a negative separates 
them ; as, God is not the author of evil. 
And as, in all cases, the predicate must 
either be connected with the subject, or 
separated from it, it is evident that all 
propositions fall under these two divi- 
sions. 

An universal proposition is a propo- 
sition which has for its subject some ge- 
neral term taken in its full extent; so 
that the predicate agrees with all the in- 
dividuals comprehended under it, if it 
be a proper species, and with all the 
several spepies and their individuals, if 
it be what is termed a genus. Thus. 



74 
All animals have a power of beginning 
motion, is an universal proposition; ani- 
mals, the subject, being a general term 
without any mark of limitation, and by 
consequence taken in its full extent: 
hence the power of beginning motion 
may be affirmed of all the several spe- 
cies of animals, as of quadrupeds, birds, 
insects, fishes, &c. ; and of all the indi- 
viduals of which these different species 
consist, as of this hawk, that horse, and 
so on with respect to the rest. A parti- 
cular proposition is one, which has, in 
like manner, some general term for its 
subject ; but with a mark of limitation 
added, to denote that the predicate 
agrees with some only of the individu- 
als comprehended under it, if it be a 
species, or with one or more, not with 



75 
all, of the species belonging to it, if it 
be a genus. Thus, Some stones are 
heavier than iron — Some men have an 
uncommon share of prudence. Where 
the subject of a proposition is an indi- 
vidual, his called a singular proposi- 
tion. Of this nature are the follow- 
ing, Sir Isaac Newton was the inven- 
tor of fluxions — This book contains 
many useful truths. And such propo- 
sitions, though more particular than 
those which are generally called so, 
come under the same rule with univer- 
sal; because, in them, the subject is 
taken in its full extent. 

It has been already observed, that all 
propositions are either affirmative or 
negative: it is equally evident, that, in 
both cases, they may be universal or 



76 
particular. Hence arises that celebra- 
ted fourfold division of them, into uni- 
versal AFFIRMATIVE, UNIVERSAL NE- 
GATIVE; PARTICULAR AFFIRMATIVE, 

and particular negative. And, in. 
forming syllogisms, it has become a 
custom, in the schools, to make use of 
the four vowels, #, £, *', 0, to denote 
these varieties: #, to denote an univer- 
sal affirmative, as, All good men are es- 
teemed ; e^ an universal negative, as, No 
man is infallible; i, a particular affirma- 
tive, as, Some men are wise; 0, a parti- 
cular negative, as, Some men are not 
honest.* 

The distinction of propositions into 
universal and particular, is called their 

* " Asserit a, negat e, verum generalitcr ainbce ;" 
" Asserit i, negat o, sed fiavticularit er ambo^ 



77 
quantity; and into affirmative and 
negative, their quality. 

Absolute propositions are those in 
which we affirm, that some property is 
inseparable from the idea of the subject; 
as, Lead is heavy. Conditional proposi- 
tions are those in which the predicate is 
not necessarily connected with the sub- 
ject, and can be affirmed of it on some 
condition only, distinct from the idea of 
the subject;" as, If a stone he exposed to 
the rays of the sun, it will contract a de- 
gree of heat. And here we are to ob- 
serve, that all conditional propositions 
consist of two distinct parts ; one, ex- 
pressing the condition upon which the 
predicate agrees or disagrees with the 
subject, as, in the example before 
us, If a stone he exposed to the rays 

G2 



78 

of the sun; the other, joining or dis- 
joining said predicate and subject, as, 
in the same example, It will contract a 
degree of heat. The first of these parts 
is called the antecedent ; the second, the 
consequent. 

When a proposition has but one sub- 
ject and one predicate, it admits of no 
subdivision, and is said to be simple. 
When it has more than one subject, or 
more than one predicate ; or has several 
subjects and predicates; it is said to be 
compound. If it have one subject and 
more than one predicate, or, vice versa, 
one predicate and more than one sub- 
ject, it may, in the one case, be resolved 
into as many simple propositions as 
there are predicates, and, in the other, 
into as many as there are subjects; as 



79 
will be obvious from the following exam- 
ples: The practice of swearing in com- 
mon conversation, is absurd, unmannerly, 
and impious — Neither kings nor people 
are exempt from death. Nor is it less 
evident, that if a proposition consists of 
several subjects and predicates, it may 
be resolved into as many simple propo- 
sitions, as there are subjects and predi- 
cates. Compound propositions are of 
two kinds ; copulative, and disjunctive. 
A copulative proposition takes place, 
where the subjects and predicates are 
so joined together, that they may be all 
severally affirmed or denied of each 
other. Of this nature are the examples 
which have been just given. A dis- 
junctive proposition compares several 
predicates with the same subject, and 



80 

affirms that one of them necessarily be- 
longs to it, but without determining 
which ; as, This world either exists of it- 
self or is the work of some allwise and 
powerful cause. It is the nature of all 
propositions of this class, that, upon de- 
termining the particular predicate, the 
rest are of course to be removed; or, 
that if all the predicates but one be re- 
moved, that one necessarily takes place: 
thus, in the example given above, if we 
allow the world to be the work of some 
wise and powerful cause, we of course 
deny it to be felf-existent; or, if we de- 
ny it to be self-existent, we must neces- 
sarily admit, that it was produced by 
some wise and powerful cause. 

A proposition is self-evident, when, 
without any investigation or proof, the 



81 

truth of it is obvious at first view. 
When we affirm, for instance, that a 
part of any thing is less than the whole^ 
or that men exist, and other animals; 
whoever understands the terms made 
use of, perceives, at the first view, the 
truth of what is asserted ; nor can he, 
by any efforts, bring himself to believe 
the contrary. A demonstrable proposi- 
tion is one, the truth of which does not 
immediately appear, but may be made 
to appear by means of other proposi- 
tions more known and obvious, from 
which it follows as an unavoidable con- 
sequence. 

A speculative proposition affirms or 
denies some property of its subject, as 
when it is affirmed, that the radii of a 
circle are all equal. A practical propo- 



82 
sition asserts that something may be 
done or effected; as, that a right line 
may be drawn from one point to another. 
And from this last distinction arises a 
fourfold division of mathematical pro- 
positions, intO SELF-EVIDENT SPECULA- 
TIVE, and SELF-EVIDENT PRACTICAL; 
DEMONSTRABLE SPECULATIVE, and DE- 
MONSTRABLE practical. Self-evident 
speculative propositions are called ax- 
ioms; and self-evident practical pro- 
positions, postulates; demonstrable 
speculative propositions, theorems ; 
and demonstrable practical propositions ; 
problems. 



83 



PART III 

Of Reasoning. 

The subject of tills part of Logickis 
an extensive one; and to discuss it fully 
would require much time. We shall 
content ourselves with explaining what 
is meant by reasoning, and giving some 
account of various kinds of syllogisms, 
which are acts of reasoning expressed 
in words. To which we shall subjoin 
such of the sophisms,, or false argu- 
ments, as are the most remarkable. 



84 



CHAPTER L 

Of Reasoning, and the Parts of which it 
consists. 

It has been already observed, that, 
in comparing two ideas together, it will 
sometimes happen, that their agreement 
or disagreement cannot be immediately* 
discerned. In such cases it becomes ne- 
cessary to look out for some third idea, 
that will admit of being compared with 
them, severally; that is, first with one 
and then with the other : that, by such 
comparison, we may be enabled to see 
how far the ideas, with which this third 

* That is, without some medium, or proof. 



85 
is compared, do, themselves, agree or 
disagree* For it is a self-evident truth, 
that, if two things agree with a third, 
they must agree with each other; and 
that, if one of two things agree with 
a third, and the other disagree with it, 
they must disagree with each other. 

From what has been said, it appears, 
that every act of reasoning necessarily 
includes three distinct judgments: two, 
in which the ideas, the relations of 
which we want to discover, are several- 
ly compared with the middle idea; and 
a third, in which they are themselves 
connected or disjoined, according to the 
result of that comparison. Now, as our 
judgments, when put into words, are 
called propositions ; so our acts of rea- 
soning, when expressed by words, are 

H 



86 

termed syllogisms. And hence it fol- 
lows, that as every act of reasoning im- 
plies three several judgments, so every 
syllogism must include three distinct 
propositions. And when an act of rea- 
soning is thus put into w r ords, and ap- 
pears in the form of a syllogism, the 
intermediate idea made use of to dis- 
cover the agreement or disagreement 
which we seek to investigate, is called 
the middle term; and the two ideas 
themselves, with which this third is 
compared, go by the name of ex- 
tremes. 

But, as these things are best illustra- 
ted by examples, let us suppose, that 
we have set ourselves to inquire, wJie- 
ther men are accountable for their actions. 
As the relation between the ideas of 






87 
man and accountableness, comes not 
within the immediate view of the mind, 
our first care must be, to find out some 
third idea that will enable us to disco- 
ver and trace it. A very small measure 
of reflection is sufficient to inform us, 
that no creature can be accountable for 
his actions, unless we suppose him ca- 
pable of distinguishing those which are ■ 
good from those which are bad ; that is, 
unless we suppose him possessed of 
reason. Nor is this alone sufficient. 
For what would it avail him to distin- 
guish good from bad actions, if he had 
no freedom of choice, and could not 
pursue the one and avoid the other? 
Hence it becomes accessary to take in 
both these considerations in the present 
case. It is at the same time equally 






88 

evident, that wherever there is this 
ability of distinguishing good from bad 
actions, and pursuing the one and 
avoiding the other, there also a creature 
is accountable. We have then got a 
third idea, with which accountableness 
is inseparably connected, namely the 
idea of a creature possessed of reason and 
liberty. Let us now take this third or 
middle idea, and compare it with the 
other idea in question, namely man; 
and we all know by experience, that it 
may be affirmed of him. Having thus, 
by means of the intermediate idea, for- 
med two several judgments, that man 
is possessed of reason and liberty, and 
that reason and liberty imply accountable- 
ness; a third obviously and necessarily 



89 

follows, namely that man is accountable 
for his actions. 

Here then we have a complete act of 
reasoning, in which, according to what 
has been already observed, there are 
three distinct judgments ; two, that may 
be styled previous, in as much as they 
lead to the other, and arise from com- 
paring the middle idea with the two 
ideas in question; and a third, which is 
a consequence of these previous acts, 
and flaws from uniting the extreme 
ideas themselves. If now we put this 
act of reasoning into due form, it exhi- 
bits what Logicians call a syllogism, and 
runs thus. 

Every creature, possessed of reason 
and liberty ) is accountable for his ac- 
tions i 

H2 



90 

Man is a creature possessed of reason 
and liberty : 

Therefore man is accountable for his 
actions. 

Of these three propositions, the two 
first answer the two previous judgments, 
in an act of reasoning; and are called 
the premises, because they are placed 
before the other: the third is termed 
the conclusion; as being gained in 
consequence of what was asserted in 
the premises. Man and accountable- 
ness are the extremes; and a creature 
possessed of reason and liberty , the mid- 
dle term. 

We may also observe, that, as the 
conclusion is made up of the extreme 
terms of the syllogism, so that extreme, 
which serves as the predicate of the 



91 

conclusion, goes by the name of the 
major term; and the other extreme, 
which makes the subject in the same 
proposition, is called the minor term. 
And again, from this distinction be- 
tween the extremes arises also a dis- 
tinction between the premises, where 
these extremes are severally compared 
with the middle term; that proposition 
which compares the major term, or the 
predicate of the conclusion, with the 
middle term, being called the major 
proposition; the other, wherein the 
same middle term is compared with the 
subject of the conclusion or minor 
term, being called the minor proposi- 
tion. To which may be added, that, 
when a syllogism is proposed in due 
form, the major proposition is always 



92 

placed first; the minor next, and the 
conclusion last. 

These things premised, we may de- 
fine reasoning to be, An act or operation 
of the mind, deducing some proposition, 
the truth of which was before unknown, 
from other previous ones that are either 
self evident or such as have been fully 
proved and established. These previous 
propositions, in a simple act of reason* 
ing, are only two in number; and, in 
order to afford an unquestionable con- 
clusion, must be intuitive propositions. 
When they are not so, previous syllo- 
gisms are required: in which case rea- 
soning becomes a complicated act, tak- 
ing in a variety of successive steps. If, 
for example, in the major of the syllo- 
gism given above, viz. Every creature 



possessed of reason and liberty is account- 
able/or his actions, the connection be- 
tween the subject and predicate could 
not be perceived by the mere attention 
of the mind to the ideas themselves, it 
is evident that this proposition would 
no less require proof than the conclu- 
sion deduced from it. In this case, a 
new middle term must be sought for, 
to trace the connection here supposed; 
and this, of course, furnishes another 
syllogism; by which having established 
the proposition in question, we are then, 
and not before, at liberty to use it in 
any succeeding act of reasoning. And 
should it so happen, that, in the second 
syllogism, there were still some previ- 
ous proposition, the truth of which did 



94 
not appear at first sight, we must then 
have recourse to a third syllogism, in 
order to lay open that truth to the 
mind; because, so long as the premises 
remain uncertain, the conclusion, built 
upon them, must be so too. And when, 
by conducting our thoughts in this man- 
ner, we at last arrive at some syllogism 
where the previous propositions are in- 
tuitive truths, the mind then rests in 
full security; as perceiving, that the se- 
veral conclusions, which it has passed 
through, stand upon the immoveable 
foundation of self-evidence, and, when 
traced to their source, terminate in it. 
And here, if, after having thus unra- 
velled a demonstration, we take it the 
contrary way, and observe how the 



95 

mind, setting out with intuitive proposi- 
tions, connects them together to form a 
conclusion; how, by introducing this 
conclusion into another syllogism, it 
still advances one step farther; and so 
proceeds, making every new discovery 
subservient to future progress; we shall 
then perceive clearly, that reasoning, in 
the highest exercise of that faculty, is 
no more than an orderly combination of 
those simple acts which we have already 
so fully explained. And we shall also 
perceive, that all the knowledge acqui- 
red by reasoning, how far soever we 
may carry our discoveries, is still built 
upon our intuitive judgments; every 
discovery of human reasoning being 
the consequence of a syllogism, the 



96 

premises of which are self-evident pro- 
positions, or of a train of syllogisms, 
which, when traced to their source, al- 
ways terminate in them. 



MEN reason, either to rank things 
under those universal ideas to w^hich 
they truly belong, or to ascribe to them 
their several attributes and properties in 
consequence of that distribution. 

1. One great end for which men rea- 
son, is to rank things under those uni- 
versal ideas to which they belong; or, 
in other words, to determine the. genera 
and species of things. We have seen, 
in the first part of this treatise, how the 
mind proceeds in forming general ideas. 



97 

We have also seen, in the second 
part, how, by means of these general 
ideas, we form universal propositions. 
Now, as, in universal propositions, 
we affirm some property of a genus 
or species, it is plain, that we cannot 
apply this property to particular objects, 
till we have first determined whether 
they are comprehended under that ge- 
neral idea of which the property is af- 
firmed. Thus, there are certain proper- 
ties belonging to all even numbers, which 
nevertheless cannot be applied to any 
particular number, until we have first 
discovered it to be of the species express- 
ed by that general name, Hence, rea- 
soning begins by referring things to 
their several divisions and classes in 

the scale of our ideas : and, as these di- 

I 



98 

visions are all distinguished by peculiar 
names, we hereby learn to apply the 
terras expressing general conceptions, to 
such particular objects as come under 
our immediate observation. 

In order to arrive at these conclusions, 
by which the several objects of percep- 
tion are brought under general names, 
two things are manifestly necessary. 
First, that we take a view of the idea itself 
denoted by that general name, and care- 
fully attend to the distinguishing marks 
which serve to characterise it. Second- 
ly, that we compare this idea with the 
object under consideration, observing 
diligently wherein they agree or differ. 
If the idea be found to correspond with 
the particular object, we then without 
hesitation apply the general name ; but, 



99 

if no such correspondence appear, 
the conclusion must necessarily take 
a contrary turn. Let us, for in- 
stance, take the number eight, and 
consider by what steps we are led to 
pronounce it an even number. First, 
we call to mind the idea signified by the 
expression, an even number; namely, that 
it is a number divisible into two equal 
parts: we, then, compare this idea with 
the number eight: and, finding them 
manifestly to agree, we see at once the 
necessity of admitting the conclusion* 
These several judgments, therefore, 
transferred into language, and reduced 
to the form of a syllogism, appear thus: 
Every number that may be divided into 
two equal parts? is an even number; 



100 

The number eight may be divided 
into two equal parts : 

Therefore the number eight is an even 
number. 

It may be observed, indeed, that 
where the general idea, to which parti- 
cular objects are referred, is very fami- 
liar to the mind, and frequently in view, 
this reference, and the application of 
the general name, seem to be made 
without any reasoning. When we see 
a horse in the fields, or a dog in the 
street, we readily apply the name of the 
species; habit, and a familiar acquaint- 
ance with the general idea, suggesting 
it instantaneously to the mind. We are 
not, however, to imagine on this account, 
that the understanding departs from 
the usual rules of just thinking. A fre- 



101 
quent repetition of acts begets a habit; 
and habits are attended with a certain 
promptness of execution, that prevents 
our observing the several steps and 
gradations, by which any course of ac- 
tion is accomplished. But, in other in- 
stances, where we judge not by pre- 
contracted habits; as when the general 
idea is very complex, or less familiar to 
the mind; we always proceed according 
to the form of reasoning established 
above. A goldsmith, for instance, who 
is in doubt as to any piece of metal, 
whether it be of the species called gold^ 
first examines its properties; and, then 
comparing them with the general idea 
signified by that name, if he find a 
perfect correspondence, no longer hesi- 
tates under what class of metals to rank 

12 



102 
it. Now what is this, but following 
step by step those rules of reasoning 
which we have before laid down, as the 
standards by which to regulate our 
thoughts in all conclusions of this kind? 
Nor let it be imagined, that our re- 
searches here, because in appearance 
bounded to the imposing of general 
names upon particular objects, are 
therefore trivial and of little conse- 
quence. Some of the most considerable 
debates among mankind, and such too 
as nearly regard their lives, interest, 
and happiness, turn wholly on this arti- 
cle. Of what importance, for instance, is 
it, in many cases, to decide aright whe- 
ther an action is to be termed murder or 
man-slaughter? We see, no less than the 
lives and fortunes of men depend often 



103 
upon these decisions. The reason is 
plain. Actions, when once referred 
to a general idea, draw after them all 
that may be affirmed of that idea; inso- 
much, that the determining of the species 
of actions, is the same with determining 
what proportion of praise or dispraise, 
commendation or blame, &c, ought to 
follow them. For, as it is allowed that 
murder deserves death, by bringing any 
particular action under the head of mur- 
der, we of course decide the punish- 
ment due to it. 

2. The other great aim which men 
have in view in their reasonings, is, the 
discovering and ascribing to things 
their several attributes and properties. 
And here it will be necessary to distin- 
guish between reasoning, as it regards 



104 

the sciences, and as it concerns common 
life. In the sciences, our reason is em- 
ployed chiefly about universal truths, 
it being by them alone, that the bounds 
of human knowledge are enlarged. 
Hence the divisions of things into vari- 
ous classes, called genera and species. 
For these universal ideas being set up 
as the representatives of many particu- 
lar things, whatever is affirmed of 
them, may be also affirmed of all the 
individuals to which they belong. Mur- 
der, for instance, is a general idea, re- 
presenting a certain species of human 
actions. Reason tells us, that the pu- 
nishment due to it is death. Hence every 
particular action coming under the idea 
of murder, has the punishment of death 
allotted to it. Here, then, we apply the 



105 

general truth to some obvious instance, 
and this is what properly constitutes 
the reasoning of common life. For men, 
in their ordinary transactions and in- 
tercourse one with the other, have for 
the most part to do only with particular 
objects. 

Hence it appears, that reasoning, as 
it regards common life, is no more than 
the ascribing of the general properties 
of things to those several objects with 
which we are immediately concerned, 
according as they are found to be of 
that particular division or class, to 
which the properties belong. The steps 
by which we proceed are manifestly 
these. First, we refer the object under 
consideration to some general idea or 
class of things; we then recollect the se- 



106 
veral attributes of that general idea^ 
and, lastly, ascribe all those attributes to 
the present object* Thus, in considering 
the character of Sempronius, if we find 
it to be of the kind called virtuous; when 
we at the same time reflect, that a virtu- 
ous character is deserving of esteem, it 
naturally and obviously follows, that 
Sempronius deserves esteem. These 
thoughts put into a syllogism, in order 
to exhibit the form of reasoning here 
required, run thus: 

Every virtuous man is deserving of 
esteem : 

Sempronius is a virtuous man: 

Therefore, Sempronius is deserving of 
esteem. 

From this syllogism it appears, that 
before we affirm any thing of a particu- 



107 

lar object, that object must be referred 
to some general idea. Sempronius is 
pronounced worthy of esteem, only in 
consequence of his being a virtuous 
man, or coming under that general idea. 
Hence we see the necessary connexion 
of the various parts of reasoning, and 
the dependence they have, one upon 
another. The determining of the genera 
and species of things is an exercise of w 
human reason; and this exercise is the 
first in order, and previous to the other, 
which consists in ascribing to them their 
powers, properties, and relations. But 
when we have taken this previous step, 
and brought particular objects under 
general names; as the properties we as- 
scribe to them are no other thanthose 
of the general idea, it is plain, that, in 



108 

order to a successful progress in this 
part of knowledge, we must thoroughly 
acquaint ourselves with the several re- 
lations and attributes of these our gene- 
ral ideas. When this is done, the other 
part will be easy and require scarce 
any labour of thought, as being no more 
than an application of the general form 
of reasoning represented in the forego- 
ing syllogism. 



109 



CHAPTER II. 

Of Syllogisms 1 . 

Syllogisms may be divided into 
single and compound. Single syllo- 
gisms are those which consist of three 
propositions, and no more. Compound 
syllogisms are those which consist of 
more than three propositions, and may 
be formed into two or more syllogisms. 

Of Single Syllogisms. 

Single syllogisms may be divided into 
several sorts ; of which the most import 
ant are simple or categorical, con- 
ditional, and disjunctive. 

k 



110 

Those are properly called Simple, or 
Categorical, syllogisms, which are made 
up of three plain, simple, or categorical 
propositions ; in which, the middle term 
is joined with one part of the question 
in the major proposition, and with the 
other in the minor. 

And here, to guard us against false 
inferences, certain rules have been found 
necessary, which depend on the four 
following axioms. 

1. Particular propositions are contain- 
ed in universals, and may be inferred 
from them; but universals are not con- 
tained in particulars, and cannot be in- 
ferred from them. 

2. In all universal propositions, the 
subject is universal; in all particular 
propositions, the subject is particular. 



Ill 

3. In all affirmative propositions, the 
predicate has no greater extension than 
the subject; for its extension is restrain- 
ed by the subject: and therefore it is 
always to be esteemed as a particular 
idea. It is by mere accident, if ever it 
be taken universally; and cannot hap- 
pen, but in such universal or singular 
propositions as are reciprocal.! 

4. The predicate of a negative propo- 
sition is always taken universally; for, 
in its whole extension^ it is denied of 
the subject. If we say, No stone is vege- 
table, we deny ail sorts of vegetation 
concerning stones, 

t A proposition is said to be reciprocal, when the 
subject and the predicate may mutually interchange 
their places with preservation of the truth. 



112 

The rules are thege : 
1. The middle term must not be taken 
twice particularly ( , but once at least uni- 
versally. For if the middle term be ta- 
ken for two different parts or kinds of 
the same universal idea, then the sub- 
ject of the conclusion, or minor extreme, 
is compared with one of these parts, 
and the predicate, or major extreme, 
with the other part, and this will never 
show whether that subject and predi- 
cate agree or disagree; for there will 
then be four distinct terms in the syllo- 
gism, and the two parts of the question, 
that is, the two extremes, will not be 
compared with the same third idea. 

2. The terms, in the conclusion, must 
never be taken more universally than 
they are in the premises. The reason is 



113 
derived from the first axiom, that gene- 
rals can never be inferred from particu- 
lars. 

3. A negative conclusion cannot be 
proved by two affirmative premises. For, 
when the two terms of the conclusion 
are united or agree with the middle 
term, it does not by any means follow 
that they disagree with one another. 

4- If one of the premises be negative >, 
the conclusion must be negative. For if 
the middle term be denied of either 
part of the conclusion^ it may show 
that the terms of the conclusion disa- 
agree, but it can never show that they 
agree. 

5. If either of the premises be particu- 
lar^ the conclusion must be particular. 
This may be proved from the first ax* 

K 2 



114 

iom. These two last rules are some- 
times united in this single sentence, The 
conclusion always follows the weaker 
part of the premises. For negatives and 
particulars are accounted inferior to af- 
firmatives and universals. 

6. From two negative premises, nothing 
can be concluded. For they separate the 
middle term both from the subject and 
the predicate of the conclusion; and 
when two ideas disagree with a third, 
we cannot infer that they either agree 
or disagree with each other. 

7. From two particular premises, no- 
thing can be concluded. This rule de- 
pends chiefly on the first axiom. 

In forming syllogisms, especially 
those of which we are now treating, we 
make use of figures and moods. By 



115 

the Figure of a syllogism, is meant the 
peculiar way in which the middle term 
is connected with the extremes. By the 
Moods belonging to a figure, are meant, 
the several ways in which the proposi- 
tions of one syllogism may differ from 
those of another, belonging to the same 
figure, as to quantity and quality; that 
is, as to their being universal or parti- 
cular, affirmative or negative. 

Figures are usually reckoned three. 
In the first, the middle term is the sub- 
ject of the major, and the predicate of 
the jninor, proposition. In the second, 
it is the predicate of both these propo- 
sitions ; and, in the third, the subject.* 

The moods, belonging to each of 
these figures, are signified by certain ar- 

* Subfir<s,ipYim&; bis fir ■#, secundae; tertije, bis sub, 



116 

tificial words, in which the consonants 
are neglected, and the vowels only re- 
garded; a, denoting, as was before ob- 
served, an universal affirmative ; e, an 
universal negative; i } a particular af- 
firmative; and o, a particular negative. 
And, to assist the memory in retaining 
these words, they are comprised in four 
Latin verses. 



Barbara, Celarent, Darii^Ferio quoque,primae: 
Cesar e, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, secundae: 
Tertia, Darapti sibi vindicat atque Felapton, 
Adjungens Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison, 



117 
Bar- All wicked men are miserable: 
ba- Tyrants are wicked men: 
ra, Therefore tyrants are miserable. 



Ce- No practice, inconsistent with the 
christian law of charity ^ can 
be innocent. 

la- The practice of reducing men, 
of any colour, to a state of 
slavery, is inconsistent with 
the christian law of charity. 

rent. Therefore the practice of redu- 
cing men, of any colour, to a 
state of slavery, cannot be in- 
nocent. 



* Whatsoever ye would that men should do to 
you, do ye even so to them." Matt. vii. 12. 



118 

Da- Whatsoever furthers our salva- 
tion is good for us : 

ri- Some afflictions further our 
salvation : 

i. Therefore some afflictions are 
good for us. 

Fe- Nothing that must be repented of 

is desirable: 
ri- Sinful pleasures must be repented 

of: 

o. Therefore sinful pleasures are 

not desirable. 

It is the excellence of this figure, that 
all questions may be proved by it, whe- 
ther universal or particular, affirmative 
or negative. 



119 
In the second figure also, there are 
four moods ; but it admits of negative 
conclusions only. 



Ce- No one, who is either a good 
Christian, or a good citizen, 
can deliberately resolve to do 
what the laws of God and his 
country forbid : 

sa- A duellist deliberately resolves 
to do what the laws of God and 
his country forbid: 

re. Therefore no duellist can be, 
either a good Christian, or a 
good citizen. 



120 

Ca- Every man of strict honour 
would disdain to enrich him- 
self at his neighbour's expense: 

mes- No gamester disdains to enrich 
himself at his neighbour's ex- 
pense: 

tres. Therefore, nq gamester is a 
man of strict honour* 

Fes- No sins are excusable : 

ti- Anger, upon some occasions, is 
excusable : 

no. Therefore anger, upon some oc- 
casions, is not a sin* 



121 

Ba- Every true patriot will seek to 
promote peace and concord 
among his fellow citizens: 

ro- Some, who profess to be patriots, 
do not seek to promote concord 
and peace among their fellow- 
citizens ; 

co. Therefore some, who profess to 
be patriots, are not true pa- 
riots. 

In 4:he third figure, there are six 
moods; and the conclusion is always 
particular. 

Da- All good Christians shall be sa- 
ved: 

rap- All good Christians have sinned; 

ti. Therefore some, who have sin- 
ned, shall be saved. 



122 

Fe- No hypocrites are pleasing to 

God: 
lap- All hypocrites seem to be reli- 



gious : 



ton. Therefore some, who seem to be 
religious, are not pleasing to 
God. 

Di- Some selfish and turbulent men 
make very violent preten- 
sions to patriotism : 

sa- All selfish and turbulent men are 
destitute of any real love for 
their country : 

mis. Therefore some, who are desti- 
tute of any real love for their 
country, make very violent 
pretensions to patriotism. 



123 

Da- All honest men are entitled to 
our love and esteem: 

ti- Some honest men differ very 
widely from us in their senti- 
ments with respect to religion 
and politicks: 

si. Therefore some, who differ very 
widely from us in their senti- 
ments with respect to religion 
and politicks, are entitled to 
our love and esteem. 

Bo- Some wars are not to be avoid- 
ed: 
car- All wars produce blood-shed: 
do. Therefore some blood-shed is 
not to be avoided- 



124 

Fe- No afflictions are pleasant; 

hi- Some afflictions are good fo? 
us: 

son. Therefore some things, which are- 
good for us, are not pleasant. 

The special rules of the three figures 
are these. In the first, the major pro- 
position must always be universal, and 
the minor affirmative. In the second, 
the major must also be universal, and one 
of the premises, together zvith the conclu- 
sion^ must be negative. In the third, the 
minor must be affirmative, and the con- 
clusion always particular. 

There is also a fourth ; in which the 
middle term is the predicate of the ma- 
jor proposition, and the subject of the 
minor. But this, being a very indirect 



125 / 

and oblique manner of concluding, is 
never used in the sciences, or in com- 
mon life ; and is, consequently, useless. 

A Conditional or Hypothetical syllo- 
gism is a syllogism of which the major 
is a conditional or hypothetical proposi- 
tion; as, 

If there be a God, he ought to be wor- 
shipped: 

Ijut there is a God: 

Therefore he ought to be worshipped. 

And here it is to be observed, that, 
in all propositions of this kind, the an- 
tecedent must always contain some cer- 
tain and genuine condition, which ne- 
cessarily implies the consequent; for 
otherwise the proposition itself will be 
false, and therefore ought not to be ad- 
mitted into our reasonings. Hence it 

L2 



126 

lollows, that, when any conditional pro- 
position is assumed, if we admit the an- 
tecedent of that proposition, we must at 
the same time necessarily admit the 
consequent ; but that, if we reject the 
consequent, we must in like manner 
necessarily reject the antecedent. It ap- 
pears then, that, in conditional syllo- 
gisms, there are two ways of arguing 
which lead to a certain and unavoidable 
conclusion, 1. From the admission of 
the antecedent, to the admission of the 
consequent: which constitutes the mood 
or species of hypothetical syllogisms, 
distinguished in the schools by the 
name of the modus ponens; inasmuch 
as by it the whole conditional proposi- 
tion is established. And, of this mood, 
tfie syllogism given above is an exam- 



127 
pie. 2. From the removal of the conse- 
quent, to the removal of the antecedent: 
which constitutes the mood or species 
called by Logicians the modus tol- 
lens, because by it both antecedent 
and consequent are rejected; as appears 
by the following example. 

If the sun be risen, the night is past: 

But the night is not past: 

Therefore the sun is not risen. 

These two species take in the whole 
class of conditional syllogisms, and in- 
clude all the possible ways of arguing 
which lead by them to a legitimate con- 
clusion; because we cannot here pro- 
ceed by a contrary process of reasoning, 
that is, from the removal of the antece- 
dent to the removal of the consequent, 
or from the establishing of the conse- 



128 

quent to the establishing of the antece- 
dent. For although the antecedent al- 
ways expresses some real condition, 
which, once admitted, necessarily im- 
plies the consequent, yet it does not 
follow that there is therefore no other 
condition; and if so, then, after remov- 
ing the antecedent, the consequent may 
still hold, because of some other condi- 
tion which implies it. When we say, 
If a stone be exposed for some time to the 
rays of the sun^ it will contract a degree 
of heat; the proposition is certainly true, 
and, admitting the antecedent, we must 
admit the consequent. But, as there are 
other ways by which a stone may con- 
tract a degree of heat, it will not follow, 
from the absence of the before mention- 
ed condition, that therefore the conse- 



129 

quent cannot take place. In other 
words, we cannot argue, But this stone 
has not been exposed to the rays of the sun; 
therefore it has not contracted a degree of 
heat; inasmuch as there are other ways, 
by which heat might have been con- 
tracted by it. And as we cannot argue 
from the removal of the antecedent to 
the removal of the consequent, no more 
can we argue from the admission of the 
consequent to the admission of the an- 
tecedent. Because, as the consequent 
may flow from a variety of causes, the 
allowing of it does not determine the 
precise cause, but only that there must 
have been some one of them. Thus, in 
the foregoing proposition, If a stone be 
exposed for some time to the rays of the 
sun, it %vill contract a degree of heat,*— 



130 
admitting the consequent, namely,that it 
has contracted a degree of heat, we are 
not therefore bound to admit the ante- 
sedent, that it has for some time been ex- 
posed to the rays of the sun; inasmuch as 
there are other causes whence that heat 
may have proceeded. These two ways, 
therefore, of arguing, hold not in condi- 
tional syllogisms : except, indeed, where 
the antecedent expresses the only con- 
dition; which is a case that happens but 
seldom, and cannot be extended to a 
general rule. 

A disjunctive syllogism is a syllogism 
of which the major is a disjunctive pro- 
position; as in the following example: 

The world is either self existent, or the 
work of some finite, or of some infinite 
being: 



131 

But it is not self-existent, or the work 
of a finite being: 

Therefore it is the work of an infinite 
being. 

Now a disjunctive proposition is that, 
in which, of several predicates, we af- 
firm one necessarily to belong to the 
subject, to the exclusion of all the rest; 
but leave that particular one undeter- 
mined. Hence it follows, that, as soon as 
we determine the particular predicate, 
all the rest are of course to be rejected; 
or if we reject all the predicates but 
one, that one necessarily takes place- 
When therefore, in a disjunctive Syllo- 
gism, the several predicates are enume- 
rated in the major, if the minor esta- 
blishes any one of these predicates, the 
conclusion ought to remove all the 



132 

rest; or if, in the minor, all the predi- 
cates but one are removed, the conclu- 
sion must necessarily establish that one. 
Thus, in the disjunctive syllogism given 
above, the major affirms one of three 
predicates to belong to the world; name- 
ly, that it is self -existent, or that it is 
the work of a finite, or that it is the work 
of an infinite being: two of these predi- 
cates are removed in the minor; namely 
self -existence, and the work of a finite 
being: hence the conclusion necessarily 
ascribes to it the third predicate, and 
affirms that it is the work of an infinite 
being. If now we give the syllogism 
another turn, so that the minor may 
establish one of the predicates, by af- 
firming the world to be the production 
of an infinite being ; then the conclusion 



133 
must remove the other two; by affirm- 
ing it to be neither self-existent, nor the 
work of a finite being. These are the 
forms of reasoning in this species of 
syllogisms; the justness of which ap- 
pears at first sight: and that there can 
be no other, is evident from the very 
nature of a disjunctive proposition. 



IN the several kinds of syllogisms 
hitherto mentioned, the parts, it may be 
observed, have always been complete; 
that is, the three propositions, of which 
they consist, have been always express- 
ed. But it often happens, that one of 
the premises is a truth, not only evident, 
but also familiar, and in the minds of 
all men; in which case, it is generally 

M 



134 

omitted: and by this means we have 
an imperfect syllogism, which seems to 
be made up of only two propositions. 
Should we, for instance, argue in this 



manner, 



God is our Creator > 

Therefore he must be worshipped; 

the syllogism appears to be imperfect, 
as consisting but of two propositions: 
yet it is, in reality, complete ; except, 
that the major, Our Creator must be wor- 
shipped, is omitted, and left to the read- 
er to supply, as a proposition so fami- 
liar and evident, that it cannot escape 
him. And these seemingly imperfect 
syllogisms are called enthymemes. 

And here, as enthymemes are the 
only modes of reasoning which are in ge- 
neral use, it may not be improper to 



135 

take some notice of their various 
forms. 

Sometimes the reasoning proposi- 
tion, that is, the proposition express- 
ed, as the foundation of the conclu- 
sion, is placed first; and the conclusion 
follows, with the sign of reasoning pre- 
fixed to it; as in the foregoing example: 
and this form constitutes, what, for the 
sake of distinction, may be called the 

REGULAR ENTHYMEME. 

Another form, termed by a late writ- 
er* the obvious ENTHYMEME, resem- 
bling the preceding, but yet somewhat 
different from it, is, where thereasoning 
proposition is in like manner placed 
first, and the conclusion after it; but 
with the sign of reasoning prefixed, not 

Mr. Collard. 



136 

to the latter, but to the former : for ex- 
ample, 

Since {or as) God is our Creator ■, 
He must be worshipped. 

A third form, which is termed the 

CAUSAL ENTHYMEME, is that, ill which 

the reasoning proposition, with the sign 
of reasoning prefixed to it, follows the 
conclusion; thus, 

God must be worshipped ; 

Because he is our Creator.* 

But whatever be the form of the 
enthymeme, it will be easy for the read- 

* To these the writer, above alluded to, has added 
a fourth, which he calls the hypothetical enthy- 
meme ; as, 

If God be our Creator, 

He must be worshipped. 

Here, according to our author, there is a conclusion 
gained, that God must be worshipped; founded on a sup- 
position, which, though not expressed, is understood, 
and supposed to be obvious, namely, that our Creator 



In i 
O / 

er to supply what is wanting, and to 
convert any such act of reasoning into a 

must be worshipped: And, when this supposition is ex- 
pressed, the act of reasoning will assume the form of 
a syllogism. Thus, 

Our Creator must be worshipped : 

If God be {that is, admit that God is) our Creator; 

(And you cannot but admit, that) He must be worshipped.. 

And this enthymeme, as he terms it, though it 
has hitherto been called, by all writers on the subject, 
a proposition, is, he contends, one of the most com- 
mon, and, certainly one of the most useful forms of 
reasoning in the compass of language. 

But, be this as it may, he very justly cautions us 
against supposing, that any two propositions, one tak- 
en conditionally and the other positively, will form an 
hypothetical enthymeme ; which cannot be, unless the 
attributes which should constitute the major and mid- 
dle terms, that is, unless the predicate of the condi- 
tional proposition and the predicate of the positive 
proposition, be such as universally agree, or universal- 
ly disagree, with each other. These propositions, for 
example, 

If I had leisure, 

I would dedicate much time to study, 
do not contistute an act of reasoning; because it is not 
an universal fact, that every one, who has leisure? 
would, or would not, dedicate much time to, study*.' 
M2 



138 

regular syllogism. For he has only to 
ask himself, upon what supposition the 
conclusion, which is drawn from the 
reasoning proposition, depends; and 
when this supposition, which is always 
an obvious one, is once discovered, it 
will be the proposition omitted. For 
example, 

God is our Creator : 

Therefore he is to be worshipped. 

Upon what supposition does this con- 
clusion depend? Evidently, upon this; 
that our Creator is to be worshipped. 
Let this supposition then be express- 
ed, and the syllogism is complete. 

Our Creator is to be worshipped : 

God is our Creator: 

Therefore God is to be vjorshipped. 



139 



BUT there is another species of rea- 
soning with two propositions, which 
seems to be complete in itself, and 
where we admit the conclusion without 
any tacit or supposed judgment in the 
mind, from which it follows syllo- 
gistically. This happens between pro- 
positions where the connexion is such, 
that the admission of the one, necessa- 
rily, and at the first sight, implies the 
admission of the other. For if it so 
happen, that the proposition on which 
the other depends is self-evident, wfe 
content ourselves with barely affirming 
it, and infer the other by a direct con- 
clusion. Thus by admitting an univer- 



140 

sal proposition, we are forced also to 
admit of all the particular propositions 
comprehended under it, this being the 
very condition that constitutes a propo- 
sition universal. If then, that universal 
proposition chances to be self-evident, 
the particular ones follow of course,with- 
out any farther train of reasoning. Who- 
ever allows, for instance, that things 
equal to one and the same thing, are equal 
to one another, must at the same time 
allow, that two triangles, each equal to a 
square whose side is three inches, are 
equal to one another. This argument 
therefore, 

Thi?igs equal to one and the same thing, 
are equal to one another ; 

Therefore these two triangles, each equal 



141 

to the square of a line of three inches, art- 
equal to one another ; 

is complete in its kind, and contains all 
that is necessary towards a just and le- 
gitimate conclusion* For the first or 
universal proposition is self-evident, and 
therefore requires no farther proof. 
And as the truth of the particular is 
inseparably connected with that of the 
universal, it follows from it by an ob- 
vious and unavoidable consequence. 

Now in all cases of this kind, where 
propositions are deduced one from an- 
other on account of a known and evi- 
dent connexion, we are said to reason 

by IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE. It is 

true, that these arguments may be con- 
sidered as enthymemes, whose major 



142 
propositions are wanting. The argu- 
ment, for instance, but just mentioned, 
when represented according to this 
view, will run as follows: 

If things equal to one and the same thing 
are equal to one another, these two triangles, 
each equal to a square whose side is three 
inches, are also equal to one another : 

But things equal to one and the same thing, 
are equal to one another : 

Therefore also these triangles, &V. are 
equal to one another. 

But then it is peculiar to them, that 
the ground upon which the conclusion 
rests, namely, its coherence with the 
minor, is of itself evident, and seems 
immediately to follow from the rules 
and reasons of logick. A^ it is there- 



143 
fore entirely unnecessary to express a 
self-evident connexion, the major, whose 
office that is, is constantly omitted; 
nay, and seems so very little needful 
to enforce the conclusion, as to be ac- 
counted no part of the argument. 



144 

Of Compound Syllogisms. 

A compound syllogism, consists, as 
was before observed, of more than three 
propositions, and may be resolved into 
two or more syllogisms. The chief of 
these are the Epichirema, DilemxMa, 
Prosyllogism, Sorites, and Induc- 
tion of particulars. 

Epichirema is a syllogism, in which 
we prove the major, or the minor, or 
both, before we draw the conclusion: as, 

Sickness may be good for us; because it 
brings us to consider our ways: 

But we are uneasy under sickness; as ap- 
pears from our sig/is, groans, and complaints: 

Therefore xve are sometimes uneasy, under 
what is good for us. 



145 
A Dilemma is an argument, by 
which we endeavour to prove the ab- 
surdity or falsehood of some assertion. 
In order to this, we assume a condition- 
al proposition, the antecedent of which 
is the assertion to be disproved, and the 
consequent a disjunctive proposition, 
enumerating all the possible supposi- 
tions upon which that assertion can 
take place. If then it appear, that all 
these suppositions ought to be rejected, 
it is plain that the antecedent or as- 
sertion itself must be rejected also. 
When, therefore, such a proposition is 
made the major, of any syllogism, if the 
minor rejects all the suppositions con- 
tained in the consequent, it follows ne- 
cessarily, that the conclusion must re- 
ject the antecedent ; which, as has been 

N 



146 

said, is the assertion to be disproved. 
Hence it appears, that we may define a 
dilemma to be a conditional or hypothe- 
tical syllogism, where the consequent 
of the major is a disjunctive proposi- 
tion, which is wholly taken away or re- 
moved in the minor. It follows, that a 
dilemma is an argument in the modus 
tollens of conditional syllogisms. And 
it is plain, that, if the antecedent of the 
major be an affirmative proposition, the 
conclusion will be. negative ; but that, if 
it be a negative proposition, the conclu- 
sion will be affirmative. 

The following is an example. 

If God did not create the world perfect 
in its kind; it must have proceeded, either 
from want of inclination, or want of 
power : 






147 

But it could not have proceeded, 
either from want of inclination, or want 
ofpozver: 

Therefore it is absurd to say, that 
God did not create the world perfect in 
its kind. 

A dilemma may be faulty three ways, 
1. When what is affirmed or denied, in 
the minor, concerning the several sup- 
positions in the consequent of the ma* 
jor, is false. 2. When all the possible 
suppositions upon which the assertion, 
contained in the antecedent, can take 
place, are not fully enumerated in the 
consequent. 3. When the argument 
may be retorted with equal force 
against him who uses it.* 

* There was 5 says Dr. Watts, a famous ancient 
instance of this case wherein a dilemma was retorted 



148 

A Prosyllogism is a form of rea- 
soning, in which two or more syllogisms 
are so connected together, that the con- 
clusion of the former is the major or 
minor of the following. 
Blood cannot think : 
But the soul of man thinks: 
Therefore the soul of man is not blood. 
The soul of a brute is blood: 
Therefore the soul of man is different 
from the soul of a brute. 

Euathlus promised Protagoras a reward when he had 
taught him the art of pleading, and it was to be paid 
the first day that he gained any cause in the court. 
After a considerable time, Protagoras goes to law with 
Euathlus for the reward, and uses this dilemma. 
Either the cause will go on my side, or on yours : if the 
cause goes on my side, you must pay me according to the 
sentence of the judge : if the cause goes on your side, 
you must pay me according to bargain: therefore whe- 
ther the cause goes for me, or agai/;st me, you must pay 
me the reward. But Euathlus retorted this dilemma. 



149 

A Sorites is a way of arguing, in 
which several propositions are so 
linked together that the predicate of 
one becomes continually the subject of 
the next following; until at last a con- 
clusion is formed, by bringing together 
the subject of the first proposition, and 
the predicate of the last; as in the fol- 
lowing example.^ 

There can be no enjoyment of property^ 
without government: 

No government^ without a magistrate: 

thus. Either I shall gain the cause, or lose it : if I gahl 
the cause, then nothing will be due to you according to 
the sentence of the judge : and if I lose the cause, nothing 
will be due to you, according to my bargain : therefore, 
whether I lose or gain the cause, I will not pay you; for 
nothing will be due to you. 

Watt's Logick, part iii. c. ii. s. 6, 

| Themistocles, it is said., was sometimes wont to 
use this form of reasoning, when, in the way of plea 

N2 



150 

No magistrate, without obedience: 

And no obedience, where every one acts 
as he pleases ; 

Therefore, there can be no enjoyment 
of property, where every one acts as he 
pleases. 

Reasoning by Induction, is, when we 
infer universally concerning any idea, 
what we have before affirmed or denied, 
separately, of all its several parts or 
subdivisions. Thus, if we suppose the 
whole race of animals subdivided into 
men, beasts, birds, insects, and fishes, 

santry, he was disposed to speak of, and exaggerate the 
influence of his son, who was then a child : 

My son governs his mother : 

His m other governs me : 

I govern Athens: 

Athens governs Greece : 

Greece governs the world: 

'Therefore my son governs, the world. 



151 
and then reason concerning them in 
this manner — All men have the power 
of beginning motion ; all beasts have this 
power; all birds; all insects; all fishes: 
therefore all animals have the power of 
beginning motion — the argument is an 
Induction. The truth of the conclusion, 
in this way of reasoning, depends upon 
the parts and subdivisions being fully 
enumerated. 



TO this chapter, which treats of va- 
rious kinds of syllogisms, it may not be 
improper to add some account of seve- 
ral sorts of arguments, which are usu- 
ally distinguished by Latin names. For 
as these names will occasionally occur, 
in books and in conversation, it will be 



152 

of use to understand what is meant by 
them. 

Demonstrations a priori are those 
which prove the effect from the cause; 
as, The scripture is infallible; because 
it is the word of God who cannot lie. 
Demonstrations a posteriori, on the 
contrary, are those which prove the 
cause from the effect: as, All the works 
of God are useful and well contrived: I 
therefore the Creator is wise and good. 

The ARGUMENTUM DUCENS IN AB- 

surdum has been already explained. 
We shall only add, that it is sometimes 
called reductio ad absurdum, and a 

proof PER IMPOSSIBILE. 

When we infer, that a certain propo- 
sition is true, because another has been 
proved to be true, which is less proba- 



153 

ble, this is called an argument ex mi- 
nus PROBABILI AD MAGIS. 

When we argue from the certainty of 
a thing in the same circumstances, we 
are said to argue ex pari. 

When we prove the truth of any pro- 
position, upon which, if proved, our op- 
ponent had agreed to admit the truth of 
the proposition in question, this is an 
argument ex concesso. 

When an argument is taken from the 
nature of things and addressed to the 
reason of mankind, it is called argu- 

MENTUM AD JUDICIUM. 

When it is borrowed from some con- 
vincing testimony, it is argumentum 
ad fidem. 

When it is drawn from any insuffi- 
cient medium whatsoever, in confidence 



154 
that our opponent has not skill to refute 
or answer it, this is argumentum ad 

IGNORANTIAM. 

When we prove a thing to be true, 
or false, from the professed opinion of 
the person with whom we dispute, it is 
named argumentum ad hominem. 

When the argument is brought from 
the sentiments of some wise, grave, or 
good men, whose authority we reve- 
rence and hardly dare oppose, it is called 
argumentum ad verecundiam, or ad 

MODESTIAM. 

When we expose a man to hatred by 
alleging that his opinion has been held 
by some hereticks or wicked men, cal- 
ling him a Socinian, a Jacobin, or the 
like, it is argumentum ab invidia 

DEDUCTUM. 



155 
And, lastly, when an argument is 
borrowed from any topicks, which are 
suited to engage the inclinations or pas- 
sions of the hearers on the side of the 
speaker, rather than to convince their 
judgments, this is argumentum ad 
passiones, or, if it be made publickly, 

AD POPULUM. 



I5b 



CHAPTER III. 

Of Sophisms. 

Sophisms are false arguments which 
have the appearance of being true. 

The most remarkable of them are 
reduced by Logicians to the following 
heads. 

1. Ignorantia elenchi, or a mis- 
take of the question. As if, the ques- 
tion being put, whether excess of wine 
be hurtful to those who indulge in it, any- 
one should argue, that wine revives 
the spirits, gives a man courage, and 
makes him more strong and active; and 



157 

then take it for granted, that the point 
in debate is fully determined. But what, 
it might be answered, is all this to the 
purpose? Wine, taken in moderation, 
may have all these good effects which 
you ascribe to it; but the question is not, 
what are the effects of wine taken in 
moderation, but what are the effects of 
it when taken to excess. 

2. Petitio principii, or a supposi- 
tion of what is not granted; as, 

There is no salvation out of the church: 
Protestants are out of the church: 
Therefore^ Protestants cannot be saved. 
The minor is here taken for granted, 
which is by no means to be allowed. 

3. A circle is, when we prove one 
of the premises by the conclusion. 

o 



158 

As if one were to reason thus: 

The church being infallible, what she 
testifies must be believed: 

But the church testifies, that the scrip- 
tures are the word of God: 

Therefore, that the scriptures are the 
word of God, must be believed. 
- — and, on being asked how it appears 
that the church is infallible, should un- 
dertake to prove it, as follows: 

The scriptures being the word of God, 
what they teach must be believed: 

But the scriptures teach us that the 
church is infallible: 

Therefore that the church is infalli- 
ble, must be believed. 
In this way we might prove any thing. 

4. Non causa pro causa, or the as- 
signation of a false cause: as if any one, 



159 
when an infectious disease is imported 
into a city, should impute the misfor- 
tune to the anger of God. 

5. Fallacia accidentis ; when we 
argue from what is true by accident, to 
what is true in the nature of, things. 
So if opium, or the Peruvian bark, has 
been used imprudently, or unsuccess- 
fully, so as to do injury; some abso- 
lutely pronounce against the use of the 
bark, or of opium, on all occasions, and 
are ready to call them poisons. 

6. The next sophism borders on the 
former; and is, when we argue from 
that which is true in particular circum- 
stances, to prove the same thing true 
simply, that is, abstractedly from all cir- 
cumstances: this is called, in the schools. 



160 

a sophism a dicto secundum quid, ad 
dictum simpliciter; as, 

That which is bought in the shambles 
is eaten for dinner: 

Raw meat is bought in the shambles : 

Therefore raw meat is eaten for din- 
ner. 

This sort of sophism has its reverse, 
when we argue a dicto simpliciter 
ad dictum secundum quid; or, to 
express it in English, from that which 
is true simply, or abstractedly from parti- 
cular circumstances, to prove the same 
thing true when attended with such 
circumstances: as if a traitor should ar- 
gue from the sixth commandment, Thou 
shalt not kill, to prove that he himself 
ought not to be hanged. 



161 

7. There are also sophisms of com- 
position and division. 

A sophism of composition is, when 
we infer any thing concerning ideas in 
a compounded sense, which is only true 
in a divided sense ; as. 

Two and three are even and odd: 

Five are two and three: 

Therefore jive is even and odd. 

A sophism of division is, when we 
infer the same thing concerning ideas 
in a divided sense, which is only true 
in a compound sense. As, 

Five is one number: 

Two and three are Jive: 

Therefore two and three are one num- 
ber. 

Lastly, sophisms arise also from the 

ambiguity of words ; and indeed several 
02 



162 

of the former fallacies might be reduced 

to this head. As if one should argue 

thus, 

A church is a building of stone: 
A religious assembly is a church: 
Therefore a religious assembly is a 

building of stone. 



Besides the special description of 
true syllogisms and sophisms already 
given, and the rules by which the one 
are formed and the other refuted; there 
are these two general methods of redu- 
cing all syllogisms whatever to a test of 
their truth or falsehood. 

1. One of the premises must contain the 
conclusion, and the other must show that the 
conclusion is contained in it. 



163 
For the illustration of this, let us 
take the following example: 

Whosoever is a slave to his natural incli- 
nations is miserable : 

A wicked man is a slave to his natural in- 
clinations : 

Therefore a wicked man is miserable. 

Here it is evident, that the major 
proposition contains the conclusion; for, 
under the general character of a slave to 
natural inclinations^ a wicked man is 
contained or included; and the minor 
proposition declares it: whence a con- 
clusion is evidently deduced that the 
wicked man is miserable. 

2. As the terms in every syllogism are 
usually repeated twice, so they must be taken 
precisely in the same sense in both places. 

For the greater part of the mistakes, 



164 
which arise in forming syllogisms, is de- 
rived from some little difference in the 
sense of one of the terms in the two 
parts of the syllogism wherein it is 
used. 

It is a sin to kill a man : 

A murderer is a man : 

Therefore it is a sin to kill a murderer. 

Here the word kill in the first propo- 
sition signifies to kill unjustly, or with- 
out law ; in the conclusion, it is taken 
absolutely for putting a man to death in 
general ; and therefore the inference is 
not good. 

What I am is a man : 
You are not what I am : 
Therefore you are not a man. 

Here, what I am, in the major pro- 
position, is taken specially, for my na- 



165 
hire; but, in the minor proposition, the 
same words are taken individually , for 
my person : therefore the inference must 
be false; for the syllogism does not 
take the term what J am both times in 
the same sense. 

He who says, you are an animal, says 
true : 

But he who says, you are a goose, says, 
you are an animal: 

Therefore he who says, you are a goose, 
says trite* 

In the major proposition the word 
animal is the predicate of an inciden- 
tal proposition; which incidental pro- 
position being affirmative renders the 
predicate of it particular, according to 
the third axiom. And consequently 
the word animal there, signifies only 



166 
human animality. In the minor pro- 
position the word animal for the same 
reason signifies the animality of a 
goose; therefore it becomes an ambigu* 
ous term, and unfit to build a conclu- 
sion upon. 



167 



PART IV. 

Of Method. 

WE have now done with the three 
first operations of the mind. There is 
yet a fourth, which regardV the dispo- 
sal and arrangement of our thoughts in 
such a manner as that 'their mutual 
connexion and dependence may be 
clearly seen; and this is what logicians 

call METHOD. 

In unfolding any part of human 
knowledge, the relations of things do 
not always immediately appear, up- 
on comparing them with one another. 



168 

Hence we have recourse to intermediate 
ideas, and by means of them are fur- 
nished with those previous proposi- 
tions that lead to the conclusion we are 
in quest of. And if it so happen, that 
the previous propositions themselves 
are not sufficiently evident, we endea- 
vour by new middle terms to ascertain 
their truth; still tracing things back- 
ward, in a continued series, until at 
length we arrive at some syllogism 
where the premises are first and self- 
evident principles. This done, we be- 
come perfectly satisfied as to the truth 
of all the conclusions we have passed 
through, inasmuch as they are now 
seen to stand upon the firm and im- 
movable foundation of our intuitive per- 
ceptions. And as we arrived at this 






169 
certainty by tracing our conclusions 
backward to the original principles from 
which they are deduced; so we may at 
any time renew it by a direct contrary 
process, if, beginning with these princi- 
ples, we carry the train of our thoughts 
forward, until they lead us, by a con- 
nected chain of proofs, to the very last 
conclusion of the series. 

Hence it appears, that, in disposing 
and putting together our thoughts (either 
for our own use, — that the discoveries 
which we have made may at all times 
be open to the review of our minds ; or 
for the communicating or unfolding of 
these discoveries to others), there are 
two ways of proceeding, equally within 
our choice. For we may so propose 
the truths relating to any part of know- 



170 

ledge, as they presented themselves to 
the mind in the manner of investigation; 
carrying on the series of proofs in a 
reverse order, until they at last termi- 
nate in first principles: or, beginning 
with these principles, we may take the 
contrary way ; and from them deduce, 
by a direct train of reasoning, all the se- 
veral propositions we want to establish. 
This diversity, in the manner of arrang- 
ing our thoughts, gives rise to the two- 
fold division of method established by 
logicians. For method, according to 
their use of the word, is nothing else 
than the order and disposition of our 
thoughts relating to any subject. When 
truths are so disposed and put together, 
as they were or might have been dis- 
covered, this is called the analytic 



171 
method, or the METHOD of resolu- 
tion ; inasmuch as it traces things 
backward to their source, and resolves 
knowledge into its first and original 
principles. When, on the other hand, , 
truths are deduced from these first 
principles, and connected according to 
their mutual dependence, so that the 
truths first in order tend always to the 
demonstration of those which follow, this 
constitutes what we call the synthetick 

METHOD, Or METHOD OF COMPOSITION. 

The first of these has also obtained the 
name of the method of invention; 
because it observes the order in which 
our thoughts succeed one another in the 
invention or discovery of truth: the 
other again is often denominated the 
method of science; inasmuch as, in 



172 

laying our thoughts before others, we 
generally choose to proceed in the syn- 
thetick manner, deducing them from 
their first principles. 



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Critical Rev. April, 1807. 

Lectures on Ecclesiastical Histo- 
ry; by the late George Campbell, d. d. 
principal of Marischal college, Aberdeen. 
To which is added, his celebrated Essay on 
Miracles, containing an examination of prin- 
ciples advanced by David Hume, Esq. 

The piety and learning of Dr. Campbell, and 
his character as a writer, are too well known to 
require comment or remark. These discourses on 
church history were delivered in a course of The- 
ological Lectures to the students of Marischal col- 
lege. For more than the last twenty years of his 
life, his lectures occupied the greater part of his 
time; he every year revised, added to, and cor- 
rected them. Upon his death this publication was 
earnestly called for, and it has been considered as 
w r ell worthy of the high reputation it bestowed up- 
on its author during his life. As to the " Immortal 
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on the truth of the gospel Miracles. At the present 



moment, when the question of the right of episco- 
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particularly interesting, as, u containing an accurate 
historical deduction of the progress of church pow- 
er and the establishment of a hierarchy," and as 
being u clear and decisive in all that may be term- 
ed the hinge of the controversy between high 
church and others." Eng.Rev. 

Rural Philosophy; or Reflections on 
Knowledge, Virtue and Happiness, chiefly 
in reference to a life of retirement in the 
country. Written on occasion of the late 
Dr. Zimmerman's Discourse on Solitude. 
By Ely Bates, Esq. 1 vol. 12mo. 

To those who are of a serious and religious 
turn of mind these reflections will prove a great 
and valuable acquisition. We recommend to them 
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Speculative men who live in the country, those 
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Remarks on the uses of the Defi- 
nitive Article in the Greek text of 
the New Testament; containing many- 
new proofs of the Divinity of Christ, from 
passages which are wrongly translated in the 
common English version. By Granville 
Sharp. To which is added an appendix, 
containing, 1. A Table of evidences of Christ's 
divinity, By Dr. Whitby. 2. A plain Ar- 
gument from the Gospel History for the Di- 
vinity of Christ, by the former learned edi- 
tor. And two other appendixes added by 
the author. 

The design of the author, Mr. G. Sharp, is to 
demonstrate the divinity of our Saviour by show- 
ing, that in several passages of the New Testa- 
ment, translated as they ought to be, according to 
strict grammatical analogy that article of our faith 
is expressly and positively asserted: though that 
assertion has, in our common version, disap- 
peared for want of a correct rendering of the ori- 
ginal. Six rules are laid down for the construction 
of the Greek language, the principal one of which 
is briefly this: u When two personal nouns of the 
case are connected by the copulative kai, if the for- 
mer has the definitive article and the latter has not, 
they both relate to the same person." A large col- 
lection of passages from the New Testament is 
here exhibited, to afford sufficient and satisfactory 
instances of the rule thus laid down. Alter which 



Mr Sharp points out certain other texts, which, 
containing in the original precisely the same con- 
struction, ought, he affirms, (and we apprehend 
with the fullest justice,) to be so translated as to 
convey to the English reader that they are to be 
understood (according to the rule) of the same 
person. The texts referred to by Mr. Sharp, and 
which bring with them, according to his system, 
the very important doctrinal conclusions which we 
have briefly mentioned, are the following: Acts, 
xx. 28. Eph ; v. 5. 2 Thes. i. 12. 1 Tim. v. 21. 
2 Tim. iv. I.Titus, ii. 12. 2 Peter, i. 1. Jude, 4. 
All of which are, therefore, to be rendered seve- 
rally in these significations: 

(1.) The Church of him who is Lord and God. 
(2.) In the kingdom of Christ, our God. (3.) Ac- 
cording to the grace of Jesus Christ, our God and 
Lord. (4.) (5.) Before Jesus Christ, our God and 
Lord. (6.) The glorious appearing of Jesus Christ, 
our great God and Saviour. (7.) Of our God and 
Saviour, Jesus Christ. (8.) Our only master Jesus 
Christ, both God and Lord. 

" Feeling, as we do, the fullest conviction, that 
a body of evidence is here brought forward which 
the adversaries of our faith can neither gainsay nor 
resist, we challenge them to the examination of it: 
If Mr. Sharp's rule be false, let them prove it by 
an appeal to the Greek Testament ; if the quota- 
tions in these letters can bear any other construc- 
tion than that which the author gives them, let 
another interpretation be produced. Till this shall 



be clone, and we are persuaded it never can be 
done, we do most earnestly recommend this learn- 
ed work to all those who are able to appreciate the 
value of such evidence, and are desirous to u con- 
tend earnestly for that faith which was once deli- 
vered to the saints." Ch. Observer. 

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copious extract was given in the Assembly's Ma- 
gazine for August, 1806. We think the book 
ought to be in the hands of every biblical scholar 
who can procure it. Critics of the very first emi- 
nence have pronounced that it decisively settles the 
controversy on the divinity of Christ so far as it 
can be settled by the language of the New Testa- 
ment." 

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Ballads and Lyrical pieces. By Walter 

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